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“Do-Not-Track” as Contract 
Joshua A.T. Fairfield* 
Individual liberty is individual power, and as the power of 
a community is a mass compounded of individual powers, 
the nation which enjoys the most freedom must 
necessarily be in proportion to its numbers the most 
powerful nation. 
 -John Quincy Adams, Letter to James Lloyd  
October 1, 18221 
ABSTRACT 
Support for enforcement of a do-not-track option in browsers 
has been gathering steam. Such an option presents a simple method for 
consumers to protect their privacy. The problem is how to enforce this 
choice. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could enforce a 
do-not-track option in a consumer browser under its section 5 powers. 
The FTC, however, currently appears to lack the political will to do so.  
Moreover, the FTC cannot follow the model of its successful do-not-call 
list since the majority of Internet service providers (ISPs) assign 
Internet addresses dynamically—telephone numbers do not change, 
whereas Internet protocol (IP) addresses may vary. 
This Article explores whether, as a matter of contract law, a 
browser do-not-track option is enforceable against a corporation, and 
concludes that it is. The emerging standard of online consent has been 
whether a party proceeds with a transaction after the counterparty 
informs the party of the terms of the contract. Adhesion contracts in 
electronic contexts have bound consumers for over a quarter century in 
precisely this manner. 
This Article argues that what applies to consumers should 
apply to corporations. When a consumer expresses her preference, in the 
very first exchange between the consumer and corporate computers, for 
the corporation not to track her information, the company is free to 
refuse the transaction if it does not wish to continue on the consumer’s 
terms. This Article therefore proceeds in three broad parts. Part I 
 
 *   © 2012 Joshua A.T. Fairfield. The Author is an Associate Professor of Law and 
 1.  See Daniel W. Sutherland, Homeland Security and Civil Liberties: Preserving 
America’s Way of Life, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 289, 302 n.39 (2005). 
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introduces the current methods of corporate surveillance of consumers, 
which have reached dizzying heights. Part II discusses the law of 
e-commercial and mass-market contracts, which courts have held to 
bind consumers even on the merest fig leaf of a legal theory of consent. 
Part III proposes a solution: the answer is not to continue making 
consumers read more privacy policies on various websites, but instead 
to enforce the simple preferences that the consumer expresses once. 
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This Article asks whether, as a matter of contract law, a court 
can enforce against a corporation a do-not-track option selected in a 
consumer’s browser.2  Currently, this approach is under theorized in 
the legal literature.3  This Article concludes that courts can enforce 
 
 2.  For purposes of this Article, tracking is the identification, storage, and analysis of 
who you are, where you are, and what you do online. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, 
The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1814, 1845 (2011) (discussing tracking online in the context of personally identifiable 
information). 
 3.  See Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 17-27 (2011) (outlining the problems of behavioral 
advertising on consumer privacy and the needed regime of broad mandatory regulation combined 
with an audit requirement to address the root causes of the potential harm); Julie Brill, The 
Intersection of Consumer Protection and Competition in the New World of Privacy, 7 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 7, 7 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/110519CPI. 
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consumer privacy preferences using fairly mundane contract law 
principles,4 and more importantly, concludes that courts should 
enforce consumer preferences, since this is an important method of 
returning control over private information to citizens.5  This Article 
 
pdf (explaining how the FTC might balance consumer protection concerns, such as do-not-track 
arising in the context of privacy, with competition issues); Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as 
Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1650 (2011) (discussing the role of website design in 
contracting online and how it should be part of an online agreement when it is incorporated into 
or consistent with the terms of use); Matthew S. Kirsch, Note, Do-Not-Track: Revising the EU’s 
Data Protection Framework to Require Meaningful Consent for Behavioral Advertising, 18 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 2, 54-74 (2011) (discussing the upcoming revision of the European Union’s Data 
Protection Directive and how it should require advertisers to use and respect a do-not-track 
mechanism for consumers to meaningfully consent, or not, to online tracking for use in 
behavioral advertising); Tracy A. Steindel, Note, A Path Toward User Control of Online 
Profiling, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 459, 466-84 (2011) (discussing the problem of 
online tracking for consumers and the problems that can arise, and how a do-not-track browser 
option should be implemented in federal legislation to protect consumers).  
Adoption of online privacy policies could facilitate a market-based licensing approach 
to personal data protection. When Web sites post notices saying personal data will not 
be collected, disclosed, or used except for named purposes, users who supply data in 
reliance on those restrictions may be able to enforce the restrictions. A market-based 
licensing approach may also arise if technology evolves to allow ‘negotiated’ 
agreements on the collection, use, or disclosures of personal data. 
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2000). 
 4.  See discussion infra Part III.B. This discussion highlights an important distinction 
with the literature above. This Article argues for a simple and unitary do-not-track option that 
courts can enforce as a matter of contract law. The options presented rely on federal legislation 
or the FTC directly. Federal legislation may be watered down in order to balance competing 
interests, and the FTC does not seem willing as of yet to move forward, an option it is 
considering is a repeat of a prior failed effort. See Declan McCullagh, FTC Official: Do Not Count 
on Do Not Track Just Yet, CNET NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
31921_3-20123158-281/ftc-official-do-not-count-on-do-not-track-just-yet (discussing different 
approaches by two different FTC commissioners and that there is no time table for any 
immediate action); see also FTC Says Significant Steps Made For DNT—Still Work To Be Done, 
FUTURE PRIVACY FORUM, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2011/10/18/ftc-says-significant-steps-
made-for-dnt-still-work-to-be-done (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter FTC Significant 
Steps] (“FTC Commissioner Julie Brill spoke at the Online Trust Alliance (OTA) Forum today 
and noted . . . . ‘I don’t see this as a toggle switch-on or off,’ but rather ‘a place where consumers 
can choose through a dashboard mechanism what they want . . . .’ She further stated that the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Tracking Protection Working Group is working around 
issues like ‘what does tracking mean’ and other technical issues.”). 
 5.  Courts do not currently enforce consumer preferences because the balance of favor is 
in corporate hands with technological solutions. See Emily Steel, FTC’s Proposed Changes to Web 
Privacy Rules Give Parents More Control, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424053111903927204576573021939728718.html (“‘The Internet revolution 
makes snapshot photography and wiretap technology look like child’s play,’ FTC Commissioner 
Julie Brill said . . . . As proof that the use of consumer data is wading into dangerous territory, 
Ms. Brill cited a 2010 story from the Wall Street Journal’s ‘What They Know’ series on online 
privacy issues about a life insurer that used tracking data about consumers to help determine 
their life expectancy, rates and insurance coverage.”); see also Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani 
Kane, Your Apps are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704694004576020083703574602.html (“An examination of 101 popular 
smartphone ‘apps’ . . . . reveal the intrusive effort by online-tracking companies to gather 
personal data . . . . Smartphone users are all but powerless to limit the tracking. With few 
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also asks the deeper question of whether courts can succeed in 
protecting consumers solely by construing corporate-drafted contract 
terms.  The Article argues that they cannot: a corporate-drafted 
contract will still favor the corporation on balance,6 no matter what 
tools of interpretation or equity a court brings to bear.7  On the 
contrary, the modern tools of automated contract formation should be 
available to the consumer and corporation alike.  Courts therefore can 
and should enforce consumer-offered contract terms—such as the 
preference not to be tracked—as part of a broader effort8 to restore 
balance to online contract law and the consumer information market. 
Corporations constantly track US consumers.9  This consistent 
and pervasive surveillance means that consumers are easily tracked 
 
exceptions, app users can’t ‘opt out’ of phone tracking . . . .”). Cookies are small pieces of code 
installed on a user’s computer or smartphone that allow third parties to identify a computer so 
that they can save information, such as a password or login name, or track user information. See 
Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and 
Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 271 (2008) (detailing what cookies are and 
how they work). 
 6.  See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny 
of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95, 101-05 (2006) (discussing how dominance of the 
drafter has become typical in contract law and mentioning certain defenses such as 
unconscionability or duress as potential defenses to abiding by standardized form contracts that 
are simply accepted by consumers without negotiation); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 459, 459 (2006) (“Today, by contrast, more and more courts and commentators seem 
willing to accept the idea that if a business writes a document and calls it a contract, courts will 
enforce it as a contract even if no one agrees to it.”). 
 7.  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A vendor, as master 
of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of 
conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor 
proposes to treat as acceptance.”); Fisher v. MediSense, Inc., No. 95-1004-PFK, 1995 WL 396613, 
at *6 (D. Kan. June 29, 1995) (“Undue influence is not proven, nor is a contract unconscionable, 
merely because a corporation drafts a contract.”); see also Knapp, supra note 6.   
 8.  Compare Susuk Lim, Litigation, Death of the Spam Wrangler: CAN-SPAM Private 
Plaintiffs Required to Show Actual Harm, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 155, 167 (2010) (“One of 
CAN-SPAM’s stated aims is to address the states’ disparate standards for commercial e-mail, 
which it found to be incompatible with the geographically independent nature of e-mail.”), with 
Marc Lifsher & Jessica Guynn, Online ‘Do Not Track’ Bill Introduced in California Senate, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/06/business/la-fi-do-not-track-20110406 
(“[P]roponents of do-not-track laws point to California’s 2002 passage of a do-not-call 
telemarketing bill as a precedent. However, the California law never took effect because the 
federal government issued its own do-not-call regulations in mid-2003.”), and S.B. 761, 
2011-2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (“This bill would require the Attorney General, by July 1, 
2012, to adopt regulations that would require online businesses to provide California consumers 
with a method for the consumer to opt out of the collection or use of his or her information by the 
business.”). 
 9.  See Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons 
Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 1, 11 (2009) (“Although behavioral tracking has typically been reported to be anonymous, 
there are indications that information collected online is being combined with data collected 
offline.”); see also James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“Americans have only the vaguest idea how much of their lives is 
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everywhere they go, even as they move from one website to another.10  
Consumers are even tracked offline.11  Because cell phones are 
miniature Global Positioning System (GPS)-enabled tracking 
devices,12 corporations can often gain detailed pictures of where 
consumers go in real space and can correlate that information with 
consumers’ online behaviors.13  In short, there is no longer any place to 
hide, online or off.  A number of different companies—ranging from 
Google to Internet service providers (ISPs) to smartphone application 
providers to data brokers and marketers—gather, index, sell, and 
resell all of American consumers’ data.14 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has suggested a 
do-not-track list that would follow the model of the successful federal 
do-not-call list.15  This list would be an important step forward in 
permitting consumers simple, unitary, and default controls over their 
personal privacy.  Several bills are before Congress concerning 
 
recoded in databases . . . . the widespread and fast-growing data aggregation industry, and the 
harm that can result from information collection and sharing.”).  
 10.  Nehf, supra note 9, at 20 (“When a user explores a site, the user leaves electronic 
footprints behind. By following the footprints, the site can record information about the user . . . . 
The site can also record . . . the website previously visited . . . .”).  
 11.  See Gindin, supra note 9; see also Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report; Critics Press 
Legal Assault on Tracking of Web Users, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2000/02/07/business/e-commerce-report-critics-press-legal-assault-on-tracking-of-web-users. 
html (“DoubleClick . . . has begun adding information about consumers’ offline behavior to its 
huge database. . . . DoubleClick . . . has [also] begun combining its online data with information 
gleaned from consumers offline purchases from major retailers, catalog companies and 
publishers.”).  
 12.  See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 713 (2011) (“Increasingly, smart phones come 
equipped with GPS locators . . . . Even traditional cell phones, without Internet capabilities, now 
include GPS technology so that providers may comply with federal regulations requiring them to 
pinpoint locations during emergency calls.”). 
 13.  See Nehf, supra note 9, at 20 (“Many websites secretly track a customer’s surfing 
practices through the use of ‘cookies’ and similar technologies.”); see also Tedeschi, supra note 11. 
 14.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 362 (“Acxiom, is ‘a billion-dollar player in the data industry 
. . . .’ [and] provides information to marketers for profiling consumers, manages credit records, 
sells data for background checks, and provides data to government agencies . . . .”); Thurm & 
Kane, supra note 5 (discussing mobile app tracking); Advertising and Privacy, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/privacy/ads (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (“To serve ads in applications and 
other clients where cookie technology is not available, we have engineered an anonymous ID by 
associating your device ID with a random, anonymous string of characters. You may choose to 
reset or opt out of anonymous IDs at any time. . . . The ads that appear with search results on 
Google can be personalized based on your Google Account or customized for your web browser. 
Using previous queries and Web History can help us provide more relevant ads to you.”).  
 15.  See FTC Testifies on Do Not Track Legislation, FTC (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.ftc. 
gov/opa/2010/12/dnttestimony.shtm. This was done at the urging of Congress. See Do-Not-Track 
Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011) (“To require the Federal Trade Commission to 
prescribe regulations regarding the collection and use of personal information obtained by 
tracking the online activity of an individual, and for other purposes.”). 
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do-not-track efforts and data privacy.16  However, these bills are not 
focused on a unitary do-not-track option enforceable by the consumer 
herself.  There is promise in the proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights (CPBOR) by the White House, which suggests that consumers 
should have the option to withdraw their information from use by 
corporations.17  The focus of the CPBOR is on collaboration between 
consumers, corporations, and other stakeholders.  The CPBOR 
suggests new legislation, or new industry codes of conduct.18  
Government-brokered industry self regulation will almost inevitably 
yield the same results that industry self regulation has produced to 
date—consumers bear all the cost of protecting their privacy.  This 
Article outlines how contract law might provide relief for consumers 
who seek to protect their data.19 
This Article notes one problem of terminology that is both 
important to clarify and revelatory of the problem.  When one says 
“corporate contracts,” it is clear that the contract is offered by and 
entered into by a corporation.  But when one says “consumer 
contracts” in this field of academic inquiry, it almost never means 
“contracts written by consumers,” but instead means only those 
entered into by consumers.20  As most often used in the contracting 
literature, “consumer contracts” actually means the same thing as 
“corporate contracts.”  This usage reveals the basic problem: 
consumers under modern contracting regimes generally cannot offer 
their own terms and expect courts to enforce them.  This Article seeks 
 
 16.  See, e.g., S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 653, 112th 
Cong. (2011); H.R. 611, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 17.  See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, We Can’t Wait: 
Obama Administration Unveils Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill Of Rights” to Protect Consumers 
Online (Feb 23, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-
obama-administration-unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights (“The blueprint will guide efforts to 
give users more control over how their personal information is used on the Internet and to help 
businesses maintain consumer trust and grow in the rapidly changing digital environment. At 
the request of the White House, the Commerce Department will begin convening companies, 
privacy advocates and other stakeholders to develop and implement enforceable privacy policies 
based on the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA 
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING 
INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 11 (2012) (hereinafter CPBOR), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf (“Companies should offer 
consumers means to withdraw or limit consent that are as accessible and easily used as the 
methods for granting consent in the first place.”). The proposal does not elaborate further on 
what tools consumers can use to withdraw or stop the use of their information. See id. The 
problem with this current language is that it assumes that consumers’ data has already been 
collected, a point this Article hopes to address by preventing data collection in the first place.  
 18.  CPBOR, supra note 17. 
 19.  See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing a do-not-track browser option). 
 20.  See Knapp, supra note 6, at 98; Lemley, supra note 6, at 462.  
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to reverse that trend.21  Therefore, when this Article uses the term 
“consumer contract,” it means a contract offered by a consumer, 
usually through a software intermediary, and accepted by the 
corporation. 
In examining the question of whether a consumer can expect a 
court to enforce her contractual preference against tracking, this 
Article begins with the somewhat sorry state of the law regarding 
mass-market corporate contracts targeted at consumers.  After 
reviewing some of the relevant legal trends, this Article asserts that, 
since corporations have been busy binding consumers to standardized 
take-it-or-leave-it contracts since the advent of the Internet,22 courts 
should take seriously the possibility that consumers can do the same 
to corporations.  The Article goes on to propose that the power to 
determine terms in basic contracts has been taken away from 
consumers, that it can be quickly and easily given back, and that 
doing so addresses the heart of the current problem—the lack of power 
that consumers have to determine the contractual terms governing the 
sale or use of their data.23  In short, this Article argues that what is 
good for the corporate goose is good for the consumer gander. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses the 
mechanics of online tracking and corporate surveillance of consumers.  
Part II considers the legal literature and law of mass-market 
consumer contracting.  Part III offers a straightforward solution: that 
courts accept and enforce consumer-offered standardized agreements 
on the same terms as corporate-offered agreements. 
I. ONLINE CORPORATE SURVEILLANCE 
Corporate surveillance of consumers has now achieved such 
low costs as to be truly ubiquitous.24  The exhaustive nature of this 
 
 21.  See sources cited supra note 20; see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a 
Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J.  
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 678 (2007) (addressing the lack of consumer choice in accepting 
boilerplate language in standard form contracts). 
 22.  See Lemley, supra note 6, at 465-66. 
 23.  See discussion infra Part II (discussing online contracting). 
 24.  See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research is to Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney 
and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2011) (“The online 
tracking industry is growing, inspired by decreasing costs of technology along with largely 
unregulated access to a vast amount of information sent online.” (footnotes omitted)); Jonathan 
Zittrain, Law in a Networked World: Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 80 n.58 (discussing 
the use of cheap sensors and networks by corporate entities to create “digital dossiers”); see also 
Julia Angwin, Tracking the Companies that Track You Online, NPR (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129298003 (“[N]early all of the most 
commonly visited websites gather information in real time about the behavior of online users. . . . 
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section is necessitated by the extreme nature of the technology 
involved.  It is worth exploring how pervasive and ubiquitous 
surveillance of consumers has become, so that one can understand the 
need for the legal reform proposals detailed further on. 
In the US scheme of consumer data gathering, there are 
multiple levels of surveillance,25 with the primary goal of behavioral 
advertising—tailoring online advertisements to the individual.26  Even 
if a consumer tried to take reasonable measures to avoid being 
tracked, she would find the process nearly impossible.27  This difficulty 
is due, in part, to the varied tracking methods that companies have at 
their disposal.28 
The present analysis begins with a simple premise: law is often 
necessary to solve technological problems by stopping technological 
arms races.29  This premise runs contrary to a popular view of the 
 
[There are] more than 100 tracking companies, data brokers and advertising networks collecting 
data — which are then sold on a stock market-like exchange to online advertisers.”). 
 25.  See Louise Story, How Do They Track You? Let Us Count the Ways, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 9, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/how-do-they-track-you-let-us-count-the-
ways (“The . . . study tallied five types of ‘data collection events’ on the Internet for 15 large 
media companies[:] . . . [p]ages displayed, search queries entered, videos played, . . . advertising 
displayed . . . . [and] ads served on pages anywhere on the Web by advertising networks owned 
by the media companies. . . . Typically, Web compan[ies] receive[] information about the type of 
page the user is looking at, the user’s I.P. address . . . and for advertising, the content of the ad. 
Most Web sites and advertising networks place cookies on users’ browsers . . . .”). 
 26.  See Gindin, supra note 9 ( “[T]he tracking of a consumer's online activities over 
time—including the searches the consumer has conducted, the web pages visited, and the content 
viewed—in order to deliver advertising targeted to the individual consumer's interests.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong, Demystifying Clickstream 
Data: A European and U.S. Perspective, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 563, 565-66 (2006) (“Clickstream 
data is compiled from cookie based technology . . . . [and] is used in part because web server 
technologies cannot store, sort, and render to a user the vast amounts of data required to deliver 
the respective web solutions to each individual user to a site or to authenticate a user.”). 
 27.  See Riva Richmond, Resisting the Online Tracking Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/technology/personaltech/11basics.html (“Keeping your 
computer free of tracking programs is not easy because of the ad industry’s aggressive and 
sophisticated efforts . . . . A number of tools can minimize tracking, but using them requires 
considerable effort and tech know-how.” (emphasis added)). 
 28. See Gindin, supra note 9; see also Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 
2d 1132, 1144-45 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (discussing tracking, in the broader context of copyright 
concerns, as it relates to online user’s actual identity or their IP address); Schwartz & Solove, 
supra note 2; Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14, at 362-63. But see FTC Significant Steps, supra 
note 4 (“[T]he World Wide Web Consortium . . . Tracking Protection Working Group is working 
around issue like ‘what does tracking mean’ . . . .”).  
 29.  See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 
1970) (“[O]ur devotion to . . . industrial competition must not force us into accepting the law of 
the jungle as the standard of morality . . . . Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease 
when the protections required to prevent another's spying cost so much that the spirit of 
inventiveness is dampened.”); see also Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 
81 IND. L.J. 917, 950 (2006) (“The DMCA . . . represents copyright law’s most conspicuous 
institutional response to arms race phenomena.”).  
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Internet, which suggests that computer code is a replacement for legal 
rules online.30  This view misses the point because legal rules are most 
needed when technology enables something that society deems 
immoral or inefficient.31  Laws can prevent moral failures and 
expensive defensive countermeasures.32  In the context of criminal 
law, for example, legal prohibitions on new methods of technological 
intrusion into private life are necessary to stop an arms race between 
citizen and government, in which the government develops ever more 
powerful tools, and citizens must take ever more elaborate and 
expensive countermeasures.33  Outside of the criminal context, legal 
rules operate to stop technological arms races between intellectual 
property rights holders and developers of tools that can be used to 
infringe those rights.34  The same analysis applies in the context of 
consumer privacy: law can either give legal force to consumer privacy 
preferences by permitting consumers to offer and enforce legal terms 
on the Internet,35 or it can abdicate and return consumers to an ever 
 
 30.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 5 (2006) (“Cyberspace demands a new 
understanding of how regulation works. It compels us to look beyond the traditional lawyer’s 
scope—beyond laws, or even norms. . . . That regulator is the obscurity in this book’s title—
Code.”). Lessig details in the preface to the second edition that the fundamental arguments in 
the first edition of Code did not change in Code 2.0. Id. at ix. But see Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t 
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 680-83 (2003) (discussing how Lessig’s proposal of code replacing and 
becoming law goes too far and rather that code can supplement law). This discussion details two 
important points. First, the discussion is what matters because debate over the power of code 
and role of law is critical to preserving an open Internet. Second, Lessig is right in that code can 
be corrosive to liberty and that now the Internet is marked by control. This is not because of 
consumer demand, but because corporations control code and consumers are powerless. See 
LESSIG, supra note 30, at 38; discussion infra note 32.  
 31.  See Nick Bilton, Congress Presses Apple on App Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/congress-presses-chief-on-app-privacy; discussion infra 
notes 36-39; see also duPont, 431 F.2d at 1016-17. 
 32.  See duPont, 431 F.2d at 1016-17; see also Scott Cleland, Why We Need A ‘Do-
Not-Track’ Bill, WASH. POST, May 10, 2011, http://live.washingtonpost.com/why-you-cant-trust-
google-scott-cleland-0510.html (“People deserve the right to vote for themselves if they want to 
be tracked so they can get targeted ads, or they don't want to be tracked to protect their 
privacy/security and that of their family. [R]ight now people have no real choice because the 
technology is way ahead of what people want and the state of the law.”); discussion infra notes 
36-39. 
 33.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that attachment of a GPS 
unit to a car, and use of the GPS unit to track movements of the car, was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (holding that the 
government’s use of thermal imaging technology to observe behavior inside the home constituted 
a search under the Fourth Amendment); see also Stephen A. Josey, Note, Along for the Ride: GPS 
and the Fourth Amendment, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 161, 170-77 (2011) (discussing United 
States v. Jones and the government’s intrusion aided by technology—police use of GPS on cars to 
track citizen’s movements constantly over an extended period of time). 
 34.  See Kovarsky, supra note 29, at 969-70.  
 35.  See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form 
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 
305 n.3 (2008) (“[T]he digital environment can potentially offer a very different contractual 
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more desperate technological battle to protect their privacy.  This Part 
discusses the mechanics of online corporate surveillance with a view 
toward explaining why a legal, and not a technical, solution is 
necessary. 
A. The Mechanisms of Surveillance 
US corporations have unfettered access to information about 
every aspect of their customers’ lives.36  The original means of tracking 
consumers’ online movements relied on a system of “cookies”—small 
bits of code located on a consumer’s computer that would permit a 
given website to track where on the site the consumer had gone.37  
Corporations still use this technology, but it has largely been 
outmoded38 by advertisement server tracking, which can track 
consumers across the Internet without cookies through Uniform 
Resource Locators (URLs), search queries, or assigned random ID 
numbers to end users.39  Worse, spyware located directly on the user’s 
computer or smartphone can secretly relay information to ISPs or 
other online services.40 
This Section begins with the most obvious threat to consumer 
privacy: corporate tracking that puts software directly on the 
consumer’s computer.41  It then proceeds outwards, from the 
 
setting, providing consumers with an ‘electronic butler’ that will automatically signal the 
consumers’ contractual preferences to the various vendors.”). 
 36.  See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14 at 359 (“Currently, the collection and use of 
personal data by businesses and government is spinning out of control. An entire industry 
devoted primarily to processing and disseminating personal information has arisen, and this 
industry is not well-regulated.”). 
 37.  See Rubinstein et al., supra note 5, at 271-72.  
 38.  See Erik Larkin, Browser Fingerprinting Can ID You Without Cookies, PCWORLD 
(Jan. 29, 2010, 11:04 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/188161/browser_fingerprinting_can_id 
_you_without_cookies.html (“The specific combination of mundane information such as your 
plugins and system fonts can be used to create a ‘fingerprint’ for your browser that could 
potentially uniquely identify you.”); see also Peter Eckersley, Help EFF Research Web Browser 
Tracking, EFF (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01/help-eff-research-web-
browser-tracking (“Traditionally, people assume they can prevent a website from identifying 
them by disabling cookies on their web browser. Unfortunately, this is not the whole story.”). 
 39.  See Rubinstein et al., supra note 5, at 272 (“Today, concerns over cookies seem 
almost quaint. . . . Recent privacy concerns now center on web services—and especially search 
engines.”); see also Advertising and Privacy, supra note 14. 
 40.  See Ian Sherr & Anton Troianovski, Tracking-Software Maker Stirs Phone-Privacy 
Fears, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020401200457 
7072652397112014.html (“[S]oftware . . . from a company called Carrier IQ Inc.[,] . . . not 
transparently visible to consumers, is shown tracking actions such as when buttons are pressed 
and collecting personal data such as the content of text messages.”).  
 41.  It is useful at this point to add one major caveat. This article treats privacy through 
the lens of contract law. Privacy has also been approached as a basic or a constitutional right. 
See Orin S. Kerr, The Case For The Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 588 (2009). It is 
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consumer’s computer to the Internet connection, to the ISP that 
provides that connection, and to the servers of online service and 
application providers.42 
1. On the Desktop 
Consumer information starts on the desktop.  Everyone is 
aware of cookies, but anti-cookie browsing technology does not really 
protect consumer privacy.  Anti-cookie technology, like the so-called 
“In Private” browsing mode,43 and equivalents such as Google’s 
“Incognito,”44 have been an important selling point for pure 
free-market advocates.  The claim is that the existence of such options 
demonstrates that the market in consumer information is both 
functional and respectful of consumer choices regarding privacy.45  Yet 
 
certainly true that consumers are being tracked everywhere, that this information ends up in 
unanticipated corporate and government hands without any of the constraints of the 
Constitution, and that this state of affairs is corrosive to free societies. Id. But this Article is 
about contract law, not constitutional law. 
 42.  See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14, at 359 (“Increasingly, the government is 
relying on data-broker companies to supply personal data for intelligence and law enforcement 
purposes. As a result, the government is navigating around the protections of the Privacy Act of 
1974 . . . .”). 
 43.  See Edward C. Baig, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 8 Lets You Browse in Private, 
USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/edwardbaig/2008-08-27-
Internet-explorer-8_N.htm (“With ‘InPrivate’ browsing turned on, all traces of the sites you visit 
are removed from the Web history. No Web cookies . . . are left behind after you close a session.”). 
But see Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Quashed Effort to Boost Online Privacy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383530439838568.html 
(“Explorer [requires] the consumer to turn on the feature that blocks tracking by websites, called 
InPrivate Filtering. It wasn’t activated automatically. What’s more, even if consumers turn the 
feature on, Microsoft designed the browser so InPrivate Filtering doesn’t stay on permanently. 
Users must activate the privacy setting every time they start up the browser.”); What is 
InPrivate Browsing, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/windows-vista/What-is-
InPrivate-Browsing (last visited Dec. 22, 2011) (“While you are surfing using InPrivate 
Browsing, Internet Explorer stores some information—such as cookies and temporary Internet 
files—so that the webpages you visit will work correctly. However, at the end of your InPrivate 
Browsing session, this information is discarded.”). 
 44.  See Jennifer Valentino-Devries, How to Avoid Prying Eyes, WALL ST. J., July 30, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383203092034876.html (“All 
major browsers offer a ‘private browsing’ mode to limit cookies. Chrome calls it ‘Incognito.’ 
Internet Explorer calls it ‘InPrivate Browsing,’ . . . . Private browsing doesn’t block cookies. It 
deletes cookies each time you close the browser or turn off private browsing . . . .”). 
 45.  See Wingfield, supra note 43 (“Mr. Cullen, Microsoft’s chief Privacy strategist, says 
the input of outsiders helped Microsoft strike a balance between privacy and advertising 
interests. The browser, he says, ‘was a better product than when it came off the drawing-room 
floor of the Internet Explorer group.’”). But see Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software 
Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME. 
L. REV. 583, 601-02 (2006) (“People do not change defaults when they are uninformed that 
another choice exists. If a person does not know about the possibility of changing an option or the 
ramifications of each choice, then a default setting is equivalent to a fixed setting.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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such options cause consumers to erroneously believe that they are not 
being tracked.46  Pure free-market advocates claim that corporations 
have every bit as much of an interest in selling privacy-enhancing 
products to consumers as they do in marketing surveillance products 
to advertisers.47  This analysis is incomplete—the companies that 
effectively defend privacy often rely on open-source code rather than 
private products.  Corporate “privacy tools” more often turn out to be 
channels for the consumer to permit the corporation to use her data in 
new ways.48  It is therefore unsurprising that emerging corporate tools 
are neither simple, nor usable, nor truly effective.49 
A closer look at current technology may help to illustrate why 
it is so difficult for consumers to engage in privacy self-help with 
currently available anti-surveillance products.  To access a website, a 
user requests a URL—the string of characters in the address field that 
identifies and locates the website.50  The website can compose a 
unique URL on the fly, which acts as a server-side digital footprint 
that tracks the user’s activity.  The URL can change depending on 
what the user clicks on, such as a banner advertisement or hyperlink 
to a related topic. Therefore, someone who has access to the user’s 
viewing history, such as an ISP,51 can track her movements by 
 
 46.  See Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Proprietary of 
Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2006) 
(“Eventually, advertisers sought to overcome the domain-specific limitations of cookies and 
instead develop a means by which they could follow consumers wherever they went on the 
Internet. Thus, the concept of spyware was born.”); Kesan & Shah, supra note 45. 
 47.  See Consumers are Key to Privacy Protection, PCWORLD (June 29, 2001, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/54183/consumers_are_key_to_privacy_protection.html (noting 
the pro-Free Market insights of some commentators, who equate the concept of “privacy” to that 
of “happiness”). 
 48.  See Barnes, supra note 46; see also Symantec Insight, SYMANTEC, 
http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeid=insight (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) 
(“Symantec Insight uses reputation security technology . . . to identify new threats as they are 
created. Based on advanced data mining techniques, Insight seeks out changing encryption and 
mutating code. Insight separates files at risk from those that are safe, for faster and more 
accurate malware detection.”).  
 49.  See Richmond, supra note 27 (“To remove tracking programs and keep them out, it 
is better to enlist the help of specialized software.”). The article then cites several programs 
designed by privacy-focused companies other than Google, Microsoft, or Apple. Id.; see also 
Valentino-Devries, supra note 44 (“Ironically, these opt-out systems work by installing a cookie 
on your computer. That cookie tells ad networks to stop sending targeted ads to your computer. 
Because these systems rely on a cookie to work, you'll need to opt out all over again any time you 
delete cookies from your machine.”).  
 50.  See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1264, 1287 (2004) (“A URL is a pointer—it points to the location of particular information 
on the Internet. . . . [I]t indicates where something is located. . . . URLs can reveal the specific 
information that people are viewing on the Web. URLs can also contain search terms.”). 
 51.  See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction In Internet Law, 50 WM. 
& MARY L. R. 2105, 2114 (2009) (“Unlike traditional letters, emails and web surfing 
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following the changing URLs.52  There is no need to put code on a 
consumer’s computer in order to know what URL the user wants to 
see or where the user has been.53  Although cookies are invasive, they 
are on the user’s computer where the user has some control over them.  
In contrast, modern tracking techniques are often located outside of 
the user’s technological control. 
Moreover, the technology to remove cookies is at least as 
invasive as the cookies themselves were.54  Norton/Symantec is the top 
antivirus and spyware protection program in the country for 
individual users.55  Ironically, their products come dangerously close 
to resembling spyware.  Norton must be invasive because it can no 
longer rely on a standard antivirus model, in which protected 
computers merely download known virus profiles.56  Certain attack 
methods, such as the Zeus attack kit,57 can create one-off, custom-bred 
viruses on a per computer or per attack basis.58  Therefore, since an 
 
communications are often copied in transit by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and are (in 
theory) easily accessed by ISP employees.”). 
 52.  See Solove, supra note 50. 
 53.  Id.; Tokson, supra note 51. 
 54.  They have to be: in order to remove cookies such as new advanced versions like 
“super cookies” or “zombie cookies,” they must be able to identify the source and provenance of a 
piece of code. See Christopher Drew & Verne G. Kopytoff, Deploying New Tools to Stop the 
Hackers, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/technology/ 
18security.html; see also infra note 103 (discussing “zombie cookies”). Thus, for example, when 
Norton/Symantec scans a document, it actually makes a copy of that document, compares the 
document to similar or identical documents that have appeared on other Norton/Symantec users’ 
computers, and then determines whether those other users have become “sick” or have remained 
healthy. See Drew & Kopytoff, supra. The best anti-botnet software is itself therefore a botnet. 
See id. 
 55.  See Ashlee Vance, For Symantec and McAfee, ‘Arms Race’ for Security, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/technology/business-computing/06virus.html 
(“In the consumer market, Symantec holds an even larger lead, with 52 percent share and $1.8 
billion in revenue last year, compared with 18 percent of the market and $624 million in revenue 
for McAfee. A host of smaller players like Trend Micro, CA and Kaspersky Lab round out the 
field.”). 
 56.  See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54 (“Symantec’s strategy is to rate software based 
on a number of factors including the file’s age and source. The company also checks data it 
collects from users about the kind of software they have on their computers. Software used by 
100,000 people is more likely to be good, while a file that no one else has is more likely to be 
bad.”). 
 57.  See Riva Richmond, New Menace in the War Against Online Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 
13, 2010, http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/new-menace-in-the-war-against-cyber-
crime (“In the battle against online criminals, a new front has emerged involving Zeus, a 
data-stealing Trojan horse that infects Windows PCs . . . . Stopping the new Zeus attack can be 
tricky.”). 
 58.  See Peter Coogan, Zeus, King of the Underground Crimeware Toolkits, SYMANTEC, 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/zeus-king-underground-crimeware-toolkits (last updated 
Feb. 22, 2010). 
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antivirus can only defend against what it has seen before, the past 
antivirus approach is now largely obsolete. 
In response, Norton/Symantec leveraged its large customer 
base into a counter-botnet.59  That is, Norton customers together form 
a network that reports suspicious programs to Norton.60  Norton can 
then heavily supplement its blacklist model (stopping viruses that 
appear on a list of antivirus definitions) and its whitelist model (only 
allowing access to websites that are known to be clean) with a new 
approach.61  This approach, termed reputational-based security,62 is a 
more effective counter to viruses.  As part of this reputational process, 
the major antivirus programs not only record where their customers 
go when they surf the Internet, but also download and scan documents 
from their customers’ computers.63  Thus, antivirus programs can be 
almost as bad as the threats they protect against, since they 
automatically obtain customers’ web-surfing history and confidential 
documents for offsite analysis.64  Much of this snooping and copying is 
not transparent to users.  Many Symantec users would be startled to 
learn that their virus-protection program was downloading and 
scanning all of their confidential information.65 
Furthermore, due to overreaching corporate contracts,66 
corporations have become emboldened to conduct searches of their 
users’ equipment as part of the installed program.67  For example, a 
video game creator might install deep-level invasive software that 
scans the user’s hard drive and looks for unauthorized third-party 
programs.68  Or, as in another recent scenario, a smartphone carrier 
might install spyware that captures encrypted URL requests, SMS 
message text, and email text, all under the auspices of an End User 
License Agreement (EULA) that authorizes the carrier to monitor 
 
 59.  See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54. 
 60.  See id. 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  See Symantec Insight, supra note 48. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54.  
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 441 (2002) (“Courts have difficulty distinguishing between 
terms that create a reasonable arrangement of risks and terms that constitute exploitation of 
consumers. . . . [C]ourts typically frame the issue as a dispute between a single consumer and a 
business, rather than as an aggregate policy that affects the vast majority of consumers and 
businesses that transact with each other contentedly.”). 
 67.  See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 68.  Id. at 936 (“Blizzard launched Warden, a technology that it developed to prevent its 
players who use unauthorized third-party software, including bots, from connecting to [the 
computer game World of Warcraft’s] servers.”). 
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“usage information” to improve service.69  This little-known invasive 
behavior is made possible via corporate contracts; the EULAs both 
enable and facilitate this “on the computer” malware consumer 
surveillance.70  They do not, however, reflect the consumer’s 
meaningful or informed consent to be surveilled.71 
Illegitimate surveillance programs also pose a significant 
privacy risk.  Encryption, anti-traffic analysis programs, and other 
precautions are rendered useless if the data-gatherer can directly 
access the data-receiving computer.72  For example, a hacker can 
circumvent hard-to-penetrate encryption by installing a keylogger 
onto the user’s hard drive that logs each keystroke the user enters,73 
or through “socially-engineered” attacks.74  One of the most popular 
and effective socially-engineered-attack methods involves learning 
about a particular person’s interests and sending her a tailored 
email.75  Once the user clicks on a malicious link within the email, the 
 
 69.  See Sherr & Troianovski, supra note 40. Another concern is where there is no 
applicable policy. See Thurm & Kane, supra note 5 (“Many apps don’t offer even a basic form of 
consumer protection: written privacy policies. Forty-five of the 101 apps didn’t provide privacy 
policies on their websites . . . .”). 
 70.  See Barnes, supra note 46, at 1547 (“Millions of people likely have spyware on their 
computers . . . . [T]hey may have ‘agreed’ to its installation by clicking their assent to a license 
agreement that came with another program that they downloaded. . . . [T]he spyware application 
may be performing . . . surveillance of every movement these consumers make on the Internet.”). 
 71.  See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14, at 369 (“Many data transfers and uses by 
companies occur without the meaningful informed consent of consumers. . . . There must be a 
way to ensure that consumers can exercise meaningful informed consent about the uses and 
dissemination of their personal information.” (emphasis added)); see also Mortensen v. Bresnan 
Commc’n, No. CV 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 131419, at *12 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 
2010) (dismissing a class action allegation based on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
as defendant adequately notified plaintiff through its privacy disclosure and OnLine Subscriber 
Agreement that it would collect and use plaintiff’s browsing behavior and through plaintiff’s use 
of the internet service, consent was given or acquiesced to). 
 72.  See Tom Zeller Jr., Protecting Yourself from Keylogging Thieves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
27, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/technology/27hackside.html (“[E]ven with 
[protective] measures in place, malicious code—including a keylogger—can sometimes find its 
way onto your computer. . . . ‘With keyloggers, you’ve literally got someone sitting over your 
shoulder watching everything that you do’ . . . .”). 
 73.  See Randall Stross, A Strong Password Isn’t the Strongest Security, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/business/05digi.html (“Keylogging software, 
which is deposited on a PC by a virus, records all keystrokes—including the strongest passwords 
you can concoct—and then sends it surreptitiously to a remote.”). 
 74.  See Sarah Granger, Social Engineering Fundamentals, Part I: Hacker Tactics, 
SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/social-engineering-fundamentals-part-i-
hacker-tactics (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (“[H]ackers may obtain information on-line [sic] by 
pretending to be the network administrator, sending e-mail through the network and asking for 
a user’s password. This type of social engineering attack doesn’t generally work, because users 
are generally more aware of hackers when online, but it is something of which to take note.”).  
 75.  Id. (“E-mail can also be used for more direct means of gaining access to a system. . . . 
A good example of this was an AOL hack[:] . . . the hacker called AOL’s tech support and spoke 
with the support person for an hour. . . . [and] mentioned that his car was for sale cheaply. The 
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hacker gains access to the user’s system.76  Eventually the data from 
an installed keylogger will reveal the user’s password, at which point 
the hacker can know everything that the user knows.77 
Online contracts between consumers and corporations permit 
corporations to routinely install spying networks on consumers’ 
computers.  But, a dangerous zone for corporations lies just beyond 
the scope of those contracts.  When corporations exceed their 
contractual grant, they are, like hackers, trespassers at best and 
criminals at worst.78   
A corporate-drafted contract is the sole difference between a 
corporation and a hacker.  Thus far, this fact has not made a notable 
difference, since courts have permitted corporations the sole and 
exclusive right to draft and enforce contract terms in the mass-market 
consumer context.79  However, this legal framework cannot last.  
Courts ought to recognize that consumers also have the right to set 
legal limits, and courts should enforce those limits even though they 
may be set forth in documents different from corporate-drafted EULAs 
or Terms of Service.  In short, just as a user must follow the Terms of 
Use she agrees to upon accessing a corporation’s website, a 
corporation should be equally bound to follow the individual’s pre-set 
Terms of Use governing her private information.80 
2. Over the Wire 
The second basic threat to a consumer’s private information is 
that a third party might intercept the message in transit, effectively 
intercepting it “over the wire.”  Although deep-packet inspection can 
reveal much about what is inside a communication,81 analysts posit 
 
tech supporter was interested, so the hacker sent an e-mail attachment ‘with a picture of the 
car.’ Instead of a car photo, the mail executed a backdoor exploit that opened a connection out 
from AOL through the firewall.”); see Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54 (“Unlike past blitzes of 
spam with clunky sales pitches, today’s attacks often rely on a familiar face and are extremely 
difficult to stop. In a practice known as spear phishing, hackers send e-mails that seem to come 
from co-workers or friends and include attachments that can release malware to steal passwords 
and other sensitive data.”). 
 76.  See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54. 
 77.  See Stross, supra note 73.  
 78.  18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
 79.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 80.  See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 81.  See Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the 
Digital Age, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 92 (2005) (“[I]t [is] technically challenging to 
classify traffic flows while they are actually moving across the network. . . . [D]eep packet 
inspection promises to overcome some of these limitations. . . . A service provider could use deep 
packet inspection to distinguish . . . traffic . . . and either block it or reduce its available 
bandwidth.” (footnote omitted)). 
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that current commercially available encryption can withstand even 
military attempts to decrypt.  Until some significant advance in 
computing—quantum computing, for example—changes the nature of 
decryption, current encryption is fairly secure.82 
Despite this, many online companies refuse to use even basic 
secure encryption.  Most websites are simply hypertext transfer 
protocol (http), not hypertext transfer protocol secure (https).83  Some 
companies argue that making a website https is too expensive; 
however, companies that have made the switch have not found the 
costs prohibitive.84  Indeed, even small companies have switched to 
secure connections.  Ixquick, a small company that runs a 
privacy-oriented search engine, already encrypts all search requests.85  
The problem has become one of entrenchment: for most websites, by 
default the unencrypted http site comes up automatically.  And unless 
consumers access a website through a search engine, they often 
request an unencrypted version by typing http instead of https in the 
address.86  Encryption should be the default; instead, we find that by 
default the Internet architecture permits third parties to capture 
consumer data. 
As with on-the-desktop problems, there are some technological 
solutions that consumers can use to improve their over-the-wire 
security.  But, these solutions do not work well or comprehensively.  
Users can fix some over-the-wire problems through a simple add-on, 
 
 82.  See Secure Sockets Layer (SSL): How It Works, SYMANTEC, http://www.verisign. 
com/ssl/ssl-information-center/how-ssl-security-works (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (“Web servers 
and Web browsers rely on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol to create a uniquely 
encrypted channel for private communications over the public Internet. . . . At current computing 
speeds, a hacker with the time, tools, and motivation to attack using brute force would require a 
trillion years to break [in] . . . .”). 
 83.  See Kate Murphy, New Hacking Tools Pose Bigger Threats to Wi-Fi Users, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/technology/personaltech/17basics.html 
(discussing that not all websites have https and the few that do make it difficult to use). 
 84.  Id. (“Gmail made end-to-end encryption its default mode in January 2010.”); see also 
Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in 
the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 378 (2010) (“Google’s decision to adopt 
encryption by default for its Gmail service remains a minority practice in the cloud computing 
industry. Users of Facebook, MySpace, Yahoo and Microsoft are still vulnerable to the same data 
theft and account hijacking attacks. While Google improved the security defaults for its Gmail 
service in response to high-profile criticism from the security community, the other major Web 
2.0 firms have shown little interest in deploying encryption technologies, and thus continue to 
deliver their users’ private data over insecure connections. The problem, it seems, is industry 
wide.”).  
 85.  See Ixquick Protects Your Privacy!, IXQUICK, https://www.ixquick.com/eng/protect-
privacy.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2011) (discussing the search engines comparison to other 
search engines and how it does not save your IP address); see also Privacy, DUCKDUCKGO, 
https://www.duckduckgo.com/privacy.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (“DuckDuckGo does not 
collect or share personal information. That is our privacy policy in a nutshell.”). 
 86.  See Kesan & Shah, supra note 45, at 601.   
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such as HTTPS Everywhere—created by the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in conjunction with the Tor Project.87  HTTPS Everywhere 
requests an https-secured connection wherever one is available.88  The 
add-on changes the default setting from an unencrypted connection to 
an encrypted one.  But add-ons can only request an encrypted 
connection.  If the corporation does not offer secure connections, the 
add-on can do little other than alert the user. 
The actors who pose the greatest threat for interception over 
the wire are actually not hackers, but the legitimate entities that 
provide Internet access services.89  Indeed, in many cases the threat is 
from employers, who function as ISPs.90  Employers may use this 
function to intrude further into the personal lives of their employees.91  
A recent Supreme Court case, for example, gave employers broad 
access to text messages on an employee’s personal cell phone.92  
Because employers control the wires and may not have their 
employees’ best interests at heart, this can lead to serious privacy 
implications. 
An ISP’s power over data as it crosses the wire is so efficient 
and effective that in many authoritarian countries ISPs provide the 
means of state control.93  Although almost every website is accessible 
in Saudi Arabia, the state logs the majority of web contact.94  China 
takes a different approach: using what it is able to detect through 
over-the-wire and packet inspection technologies to censor what 
 
 87.  See Murphy, supra note 83 (“[T]he Electronic Frontier Foundation in collaboration 
with the Tor Project, another group concerned with Internet privacy, released in June an add-on 
to the browser Firefox, called Https Everywhere.”). 
 88.  See id. (“The extension . . . makes ‘https’ the stubbornly unchangeable default on all 
sites that support it.”).  
 89.  See Werbach, supra note 81, at 92-93. 
 90.  See Jill Yung, Big Brother is Watching: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought 
Orwell’s 1984 to Life and What the Law Should do About it, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 163, 165 
(2005) (“The alarm bells went off when . . . Internet tracking software debuted in workplaces. 
Still, these practices, limited somewhat by a need to show business-relatedness, have largely 
found acceptance in some form.” (footnote omitted)). 
 91.  Id. at 165 n.8 (“GPS is a prime example of ‘technology [that enables] employers to 
gather enormous amounts of data about employees, often far beyond what is necessary to satisfy 
safety or productivity concerns.’” (alteration in original)). 
 92.  See City of Ont. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010); see also Louise L. Hill, 
Gone but Not Forgotten: When Privacy, Policy and Privilege Collide, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 565, 586 (2011) (“The Supreme Court determined that the City's search of Quon’s text 
messages was reasonable. ‘Although as a general matter, warrantless searches “are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,”’ there is an exception for ‘the “special needs” of the 
workplace.’”). 
 93.  See Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values 
and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1124-26 (2011). 
 94.  Id. at 1150-52. 
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citizens see.95  Even in the United States, ISPs retain broad 
over-the-wire control.  Apple’s iPhone tracked users wherever they 
went, and then stored that data unencrypted on the device.96  Google 
engages in comparable efforts with Android.97  Most smartphones in 
the United States recently carried the Carrier IQ software,98 which 
intercepted user communications and secure data requests, and sent 
the information to the user’s ISP.99  Security over the wire, in the form 
of secure encrypted communications, thus is not technology that only 
special people use or need to keep their extraordinary secrets.  
Instead, it is something that should be standard on every connection 
and for every device.100 
For purposes of the present analysis, the secured connection 
issue provides a useful data point.  For secured connections, the 
consumer can set the terms on which data will be transmitted and the 
corporation must acquiesce or refuse the connection.  This basic 
principle should be extended to other methods of communication 
through which a consumer wishes to make her data available.  A 
 
 95.  Id. at 1148; see also Christopher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran’s Web Spying Aided 
by Western Technology, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB124562668777335653.html (“China’s vaunted ‘Great Firewall,’ which is widely considered the 
most advanced and extensive Internet censoring in the world, is believed also to involve deep 
packet inspection.”). 
 96.  See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Apple, Google Collect User Data, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870398370457627710 
1723453610.html; see also Apple Q&A On Location Data, APPLE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www. 
apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html (“Sometime in the next few 
weeks Apple will release a free iOS software update that: reduces the size of the crowd-sourced 
Wi-Fi hotspot and cell tower database cached on the iPhone, ceases backing up this cache, and 
deletes this cache entirely when Location Services is turned off. In the next major iOS software 
release the cache will also be encrypted on the iPhone.”). 
 97.  See Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 96; see also In re Google Android 
Consumer Privacy Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (“Plaintiffs contend, inter 
alia, that Google engaged in improper business practices and violated users’ privacy by using and 
sharing plaintiffs’ data without authorization.”). 
 98.  See Marguerite Reardon, Sprint Updates Phones To Eliminate Carrier IQ, CNET 
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-57360436-266/sprint-updates-phones-to-
eliminate-carrier-iq. 
 99. See Sherr & Troianovski, supra note 40 (“Some wireless carriers, including Sprint 
Nextel Corp., AT&T Inc. and T-Mobile USA, ask some of their phone manufacturers to put 
Carrier IQ on their devices. Each said they use the technology to monitor their networks and 
improve service.”). 
 100.  Moreover, the ban on researching encryption technologies embodied in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act has put the United States ten years behind the competition for secure 
data on handheld devices. See Vicky Ku, Note, A Critique of the Digital Millenium Copyright 
Act’s Exemption on Encryption Research: Is the Exemption Too Narrow?, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
465, 478 (2005) (“To have your adversary acknowledge that defending a lawsuit based on 
violations of the DMCA would create a chilling effect on research, is a pretty strong suggestion 
that it is true.”); see also Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 535-36 (2003). 
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handshake protocol request101 is a request for technical rules that the 
computer must follow to connect.  Corporations should honor a 
handshake protocol request not to be tracked on precisely the same 
grounds as a handshake protocol requesting a secured connection. 
3. Online Service Providers 
It may seem obvious that this Article would focus on the data 
collected by online websites, mobile application providers, and vendors 
of consumer data.  Permitting users a meaningful, unitary opt-out 
choice to avoid corporate surveillance is, after all, the goal of this 
Article.  But the technology by which third parties gather and 
aggregate this data is simple and startling enough to merit attention. 
Cookies have advanced technologically.102  Zombie cookies103 
now resurrect themselves after the user deletes them; how can a court 
see that as anything but a violation of the user’s clearly-stated 
preference?104  Google Ads display banner advertisements across a 
large swath of the Internet.105  These advertisements, which sit on a 
different server than the main website accessed, redirect the user 
when clicked and retain the IP address of the computer that viewed 
the advertisement.106  By simple aggregation, Google Ads can track a 
 
 101.  See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 45 (2003) (“The Internet is not a monolithic, uniform network; 
rather, it is a network of networks . . . . In order to provide end users with universal connectivity, 
Internet backbones must interconnect . . . . Interconnection agreements between Internet 
backbone providers are reached through commercial negotiations in a ‘handshake’ 
environment.”). 
 102.  See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 2 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446862 (“We found that top 100 websites are 
using Flash cookies to ‘respawn,’ or recreate deleted HTTP cookies. This means that 
privacy-sensitive consumers who ‘toss’ their HTTP cookies to prevent tracking or remain 
anonymous are still being uniquely identified online by advertising companies.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 103.  Id. Zombie cookies are literally http code that cannot be deleted without significant 
efforts. What are Zombie Cookies? How do I Delete Them? GEEKMATICS (May 6, 2011), 
http://www.geekmatics.com/posts/320. 
 104.  See Complaint at 2-3, Valdez v. Quantcast Corp., No. CV10-05484 (C.D. Cal. July 
23, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/cookielawsuit073010.pdf 
(filing suit because of violations of privacy from cookies that recreate themselves after deletion); 
see also Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Lawsuit Tackles Files that ‘Re-Spawn’ Tracking Cookies, 
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/07/30/lawsuit-tackles-files-that-re-
spawn-tracking-cookies (“‘The story is not about cookies,’ said Scott Kamber, a privacy lawyer 
involved in the suit. ‘The story is about tracking you without consent. The fact that it has a 
benign name like “cookies” has nothing to do with it.’ He said the cookies found . . . ‘deliberately 
circumvent controls you set on your computer.’” (emphasis added)). 
 105.  See Claire Cain Miller, Google Campaign to Build Up its Display Ads, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/business/media/22adco.html.  
 106.  See Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/rights/privacy/ 
policy/privacy-policy.html (last updated Dec. 5, 2011) (“The New York Times logs Internet 
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user across the Internet through all the banner advertisements she 
views as she surfs.107  Compounding the problem, some ISPs do not 
shift the IP addresses they allocate to users, or, if they do, they 
maintain meticulous multi-year records regarding which IP address 
was tied to which user.108  For example, Sprint assigns mobile 
telephone users a single, static IP address for their data connection.109  
Any website operator or advertisement server that encounters the 
user’s IP address, or other assigned static ID number, can be certain 
that it is interacting with the same person as last time, and can also 
identify the user as the same person who used that IP address on 
other websites.110 
Advertisers and online service providers have found ways to 
aggregate information gathered from IP address tracking, thereby 
achieving total surveillance of the consumer from logon to logout.111  
More significantly, contract law blindly assumes that the user agreed 
to comprehensive and perniciously intrusive surveillance merely by 
virtue of terms of use that do not even appear on the visited 
website.112 
 
Protocol (IP) addresses . . . . We use this information in an aggregate fashion to track access to 
our Web sites and mobile applications. . . . The New York Times . . . also transmits 
non-personally identifiable Web site usage information about visitors to the servers of a 
reputable third party for the purpose of targeting our Internet banner advertisements on other 
sites. To do this, we use Web Beacons in conjunction with cookies . . . .”).  
 107.  Google now tracks users across any services of Google they use. See Preview: Privacy 
Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/preview (last updated Mar. 1, 
2012) (“We use the information we collect from all of our services to provide, maintain, protect 
and improve them, to develop new ones, and to protect Google and our users.”). This new privacy 
policy went live on March 1, 2012, and consolidated the different privacy policies for each product 
and service Google offers. Id. 
 108.  See Dep’t of Justice, Retention Periods of Major Cellular Service Providers, WIRED,  
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/09/retentionpolicy.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 
2012) (outlining data gathered by the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. 
Department of Justice); see also Klinefelter, supra note 24, at 2 (“Sites also regularly collect the 
date and time that a researcher from a particular IP address visits their site. Some websites may 
retain user information indefinitely.” (footnote omitted)).    
 109.  See Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging 
Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 210 (2011) 
(“Sprint Nextel assigns each Internet-connected wireless handset a static IP address and logs the 
allocation of these addresses for a twenty-four month period. The company also logs the URL of 
each webpage viewed by its customers . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
 110.  Id. at 210-11; see Thurm & Kane, supra note 5 (“Among all apps tested, the most 
widely shared detail was the unique ID number assigned to every phone.”); see also Rubinstein et 
al., supra note 5, at 272 (noting that “[r]ecent privacy concerns now center on web services—and 
especially search engines”); Advertising and Privacy, supra note 14. 
 111.  See Soghoian, supra note 109, at 211 (“[A] Sprint Nextel customer can later be 
tracked down based on an anonymous comment left on a blog or a peer-to-peer (P2P) file 
downloaded over the company's cellular network, while customers of T-Mobile and Cricket can 
freely engage in a variety of online activities without any risk of later discovery.”).  
 112.  Id. at 192-94.  
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A user generally has only one ISP, but online service providers 
are far more numerous.  As aggressive or intrusive as ISP contracts 
with consumers may be, they are still limited in number, and 
therefore plausibly manageable for the consumer.  If it is improbable 
that consumers will be able to manage their privacy in one 
corporate-drafted ISP contract, then it is absolutely impossible that 
they will be able to do so across thousands of different online service 
provider contracts.  The current system places almost all privacy 
transaction costs on consumers’ shoulders.113  Consumers are set up to 
fail, because to protect their privacy, they must digest, update, and 
maintain enough legal information to stump a supercomputer.  There 
is a simpler alternative.  Courts could enforce the consumer’s 
one-time, unitary expressed preference in the form of a do-not-track 
flag. 
Thus, this Article does not contest the enforceability of online, 
automated, and standardized contracts, but rather asserts that 
consumers should have the same power to benefit from such contracts 
as do corporations.  Many scholars already argue that courts should 
neither enforce these contracts of extra adhesion beyond standard 
terms that consumers expect,114 nor permit widespread consumer 
surveillance.115  Judges, however, lack any principled rationale to 
apply different reasoning to consumer-proffered contracts than they do 
to corporate-proffered contracts.116 
Therefore, if Google’s terms-of-use agreement, residing 
somewhere on a Google server, is binding upon any user who views a 
Google Ad, then a fortiori a consumer’s terms-of-data-use contract 
 
 113.  See Julia Angwin & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Microsoft, Facebook Offer New Approaches 
to Boost Web Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424 
052748704692904576166820102959428.html (“Facebook consolidated many of its settings into a 
control panel designed to make it easier for users to adjust when and how their information was 
shared with other users and third parties.”); Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Security Flaw Exposed 
User Accounts, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870 
3730804576315682856383872.html (discussing Facebook’s complex ecosystem of apps and their 
data flows). This is only one of many examples illustrating the corporate default setting to full 
tracking of consumers’ information. See also Kesan & Shah, supra note 45; discussion infra note 
120. 
 114.  See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard 
Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 272 (2007) 
(discussing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) as a way to protect consumers against 
questionable terms in form contracts). 
 115.  See Kirsch, supra note 3, at 54-65 (suggesting that the upcoming revision of the 
European Union’s Data Protection Directive should require advertisers to use and respect a 
do-not-track mechanism for consumers to meaningfully consent, or not, to online tracking for use 
in behavioral advertising); Steindel, supra note 3, at 483-88 (discussing the problem of online 
tracking for consumers and offering that federal legislation should implement a do-not-track 
browser option to protect consumers). 
 116.  See sources cited supra note 6. 
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should be binding upon a corporation that must interact directly with 
that consumer’s computer.  Online corporate contracts perhaps should 
not be so easily enforceable.  But, if they are so strong in corporate 
hands, they should be equally strong in the hands of consumers. 
B. The Failure of Consumers’ Self-Help Solutions 
Industry advocates claim that consumers should engage in 
technological self-help, known commonly as Privacy Enhancing 
Technology (PETs), as a means for constraining corporate 
overreaching.117  But why should law not also be available to help 
consumers end the privacy arms race?  Corporations receive the aid of 
the law to constrain technological arms races and stop bad actors,118 
but the law relegates consumers to self-help in order to protect their 
data.  It makes little sense that while multinational corporations 
cannot keep their data secure without the enforcement of strong laws, 
the law expects consumers to do precisely that.  The double standard 
is startling. 
Law is well positioned to intervene in precisely this sort of case, 
where the technological arms race to defend a legal interest would cost 
both sides more than the cost of legal enforcement.  Arms races are 
expensive, and when they do not have payoffs in the form of increased 
competition, law often steps in and stops the race.119  That is, at least, 
the theory.  To test whether it is true, however, one must inquire 
whether the law is as conducive to stopping arms races that are 
hurting consumers as it is to stopping arms races that are harming 
multinational corporations. 
Courts should enforce a consumer’s expressed preference for 
privacy instead of leaving consumers to be responsible for buying and 
using products that defend consumer privacy, or worse, responsible for 
reading and comprehending thousands of pages of EULAs and 
perennially shifting privacy policies.  The opposing and ostensibly 
 
 117.  See LESSIG, supra note 30, at 228 (discussing Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
(PETs)); see also Angwin & Fowler, supra note 113 (“A Microsoft spokeswoman said the 
company's proposed do-not-track feature is part of a suite of privacy tools that the company 
hopes can gain broad industry support. . . . Facebook consolidated many of its settings into a 
control panel designed to make it easier for users to adjust when and how their information was 
shared with other users and third parties.”); Jonathan Mayer, Tracking the Trackers: Self-Help 
Tools, CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 13, 2011, 3:35 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ 
node/6730 (discussing an empirical review of tracking, finding that “[m]ost desktop browsers 
currently do not support effective self-help tools” and “vary substantially in performance”). 
 118.  See Ben Sisario, 7 Charged as F.B.I. Closes a Top File-Sharing Site, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/indictment-charges-megaupload-
site-with-piracy.html; see also sources cited supra note 29. 
 119.  See sources cited supra note 29. 
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free-market view argues that corporations are free to take what they 
want, but consumers must pay (in terms of time spent surveying 
varied and complex privacy policies or buying privacy-enhancing 
technologies) to make it stop.120  That is neither a market nor free.  A 
free market would involve legal protection for consumer interests, as 
expressed in contractual terms, that is at least equal to a corporation’s 
ability to do likewise. 
One predictable pushback is that leveling the playing field 
between consumer- and corporate-drafted contracts is only necessary 
if a consumer’s other technological self-help options are inadequate.  
They plainly are—it is nearly impossible for a consumer to achieve 
even a low level of security.121  First of all, every application has a 
different threat profile.122  Since every application has to legitimately 
demand control over a significant amount of data and 
 
 120.  In a Coasean transaction-free universe, this would not be a problem. The difficulty 
is that the transaction costs in online contracting are backwards: it is cheaper for users to 
express their preference not to be tracked once, in a single, unitary do-not-track option in their 
browser, than for users to read and navigate thousands of privacy policies on thousands of sites. 
See LESSIG, supra note 30; see also Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of 
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544-50 (2008-09) (“Studies show 
privacy policies are hard to read, read infrequently, and do not support rational decision 
making. . . . Privacy policies should help reduce information asymmetries because companies 
share information with their customers. However, researchers also note that if the cost for 
reading privacy policies is too high, people are unlikely to read policies.”); Jeff Sovern, The Coase 
Theorem and the Power to Increase Transaction Costs, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 935, 943 (2009) 
[hereinafter Coase and Transaction Costs] (“The ability of financial institutions to inflate 
consumer transaction costs is not unique. . . . Online sellers sometimes hide unattractive terms 
in privacy notices.”); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of 
Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2006) [hereinafter Consumer 
Protection] (“In many circumstances, businesses benefit by increasing consumer transaction costs 
to the detriment of consumers. Indeed some practices are profitable largely because they inflate 
consumer transaction costs. Accordingly, firms increase consumer transaction costs because 
doing so enriches them.”).  
 121.  See Valentino-Devries, supra note 44 (“Ironically, these opt-out systems work by 
installing a cookie on your computer. That cookie tells ad networks to stop sending targeted ads 
to your computer. Because these systems rely on a cookie to work, you'll need to opt out all over 
again any time you delete cookies from your machine.”); see also Michael Riley & Sara Forden, 
Hacking of DuPont, J&J, GE Were Google-Type Attacks That Weren’t Disclosed, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 8, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-08/hacking-of-dupont-j-j-ge-
were-google-type-attacks-that-weren-t-disclosed.html (“‘You can’t buy enough security to match 
the threat today,’ said Anup Ghosh, chief executive officer of the cyber security firm Invincea Inc. 
. . . ‘[W]e continue to find malware from early 2009 . . .’ one HBGary investigator wrote . . . .”). 
These two comments are in the context of hackers and large corporations and government 
entities. See Riley & Forden, supra. The example is clear—these large corporations can scarcely 
protect themselves. See id.  
 122.  See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54 (“Companies like Symantec, the giant Internet 
security firm, are introducing services that assess the ‘reputation’ of software, weighing factors 
like how old it is and how widely it is used to decide if it is safe.”); see also Fowler, supra note 113 
(“‘Facebook’s complex ecosystem—with thousands of independent apps and complex data flows to 
and from apps—is a problem of its own creation,’ said Ben Edelman, an assistant professor at 
Harvard Business School.”). 
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computer-processing power in order to function, the human user 
cannot vet every decision each application makes.123 
Second, even consumers who responsibly use antivirus and 
anti-intrusion programs, and who fairly regularly dispose of junk 
information by using cleaning programs, remain at significant risk.  
Grey-market companies still rely on the complexity of computer use 
and disposal of information to gather information about the user.124  
Similarly, security over the wire, like basic encryption, can be 
prohibitive to obtain because most websites and browsers do not 
accept or allow encrypted connections.125  Even the most basic 
safeguards, therefore, such as requesting an encrypted connection, are 
often simply not available to the consumer.126 
Moreover, encrypted connections do not provide complete 
protection.  Encrypted connections can be analyzed by the type of 
traffic.  For example, deep-packet inspection technology currently 
permits ISPs to differentiate Internet traffic—telephony, movies, 
music, and so on—and charge separate prices for different kinds of 
traffic.127  Further, governments have circumvented strong encryption 
by using software that hacks a user’s computer and intercepts 
communications before it becomes encrypted.128  Thus, the 
 
 123.  See Barnes, supra note 114, at 253-59. 
 124.  See Thurm & Kane, supra note 5. 
 125.  See Klinefelter, supra note 24, at 15 (“While some research websites such as 
LexisNexis, Westlaw, and Google Search allow for . . . encrypted communication, a number of 
websites that attorneys use . . . do not . . . . For example, twenty-seven state bar associations 
provide access to the legal research service Casemaker as a benefit of membership, but this 
service does not offer encrypted access.” (footnote omitted)); see also Murphy, supra note 83 
(“[W]hile the password you initially enter on Web sites like Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, Amazon, 
eBay and The New York Times is encrypted, the Web browser’s cookie, a bit of code that that 
identifies your computer, your settings on the site or other private information, is often not 
encrypted.”). 
 126.  See sources cited supra note 125. 
 127.  See Klinefelter, supra note 24, at 14 n.62 (discussing how deep-packet inspection of 
the contents of Internet communications gives service providers the option to prioritize or create 
tiered pricing by type of communication in order to address the challenges to the capacities of 
Internet infrastructure); see also Saul Hansell, The Economics of Snooping on Internet Traffic, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/the-economics-of-snooping-
on-internet-traffic (“There are a lot of other things deep packet inspection can do that are 
perceived as rather creepy. It is great for spies and secret police, who want to know when people 
read or write about certain topics. It can identify people who send copyrighted files and block 
people from using certain programs, like BitTorrent. Advertisements can be shown based on 
what sites Internet users visit.”). 
 128.  See Steve Stecklow et al., Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion, 
WALL ST. J., June 1, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576345970 
862420038.html (“In recent years, a handful of small European companies . . . have developed 
tools to eavesdrop on Skype. . . . Most of the tools are programs that must be installed on a 
person’s computer. Often they are distributed via infected email attachments . . . . The software 
doesn’t decode Skype’s encryption, but instead captures audio streams . . . on the computer.”). 
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technological arms race continues, and individual consumers are 
largely the losers. 
These are just the problems of encryption—the difficulties 
involved in protecting what is inside one’s own communications.  
Another serious concern is with whom one is communicating.  
Democracy activists in authoritarian regimes particularly care about 
protecting the identity of parties with whom they communicate.129  
Unsurprisingly, there are far fewer resources available to protect 
individuals who want to keep this information private than there are 
available to help governments.130 
The only current, but imperfect, solution to traffic analysis131 is 
a proxy.  A proxy is a computer that acts as an untraceable post office 
box for an Internet user.132  A traffic analyst can track the 
communication back to the proxy, but not to the person who was using 
it.133  Yet there are several problems with using proxies to prevent 
unwanted traffic analysis.  First, proxies sometimes retain data logs of 
their users’ activities.134  If they do, all of the problems engendered by 
corporate retention of consumer data still arise.135  In addition, proxies 
that retain user activity logs are one-stop shops for government 
 
 129.  Id. (“[Y]oung dissidents in Egypt were organizing an election-monitoring project last 
fall, they discussed their plans over Skype . . . believing it to be secure. But someone else was 
listening in—Egypt’s security service. An internal memo . . . boasted it had intercepted one 
conversation in which an activist stressed the importance of using Skype ‘because it cannot be 
penetrated online by any security device.’”). 
 130.  Id. (“A cottage industry of U.S. and other companies is now designing and selling 
tools that can be used to block or eavesdrop on Skype conversations. . . . To enter the Chinese 
market in 2004, Skype agreed to a unique arrangement in which a special version of its software 
there filters users’ text chats and blocks politically sensitive keywords.”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 
1002 (2006); Rubinstein et al., supra note 5, at 281 (“Congress enacted CALEA to preserve the 
ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance involving digital telephony. 
This law requires telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications 
equipment to design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that a required level of 
surveillance capabilities will be built in.”).  
 131.  That is, tools employed by service providers, recipient websites, bad actors, or others 
to determine to which websites a user is connected. See generally Adam Candeub & Daniel John 
McCartney, Network Transparency: Seeing the Neutral Network, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
228, 228-30 (2010) (discussing the problems faced by the Internet and the fundamental need for 
traffic analysis, ensuring effective communications but screening for unwanted content). 
 132.  See Joel Michael Schwarz, ‘A Case of Identity’: A Gaping Hole in the Chain of 
Evidence of Cyber-Crime, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 92, 95 (2003) (“[T]he proxy server often 
functions as a security gate and firewall between the internal network and the public Internet. 
To accomplish this, a proxy server substitutes its own IP address for the IP addresses of its 
subordinate computers behind the firewall, thus preserving their anonymity by masking their IP 
addresses from anyone outside on the Internet.” (footnote omitted)). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 95-96 (“[A]t the time traffic passes into and out of the proxy server/firewall, 
the proxy server often captures the source and destination IP addresses, thereby giving rise to a 
virtual footprint.”). 
 135.  See supra text accompanying notes 9-14. 
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entities that wish to record user traffic.136  Since the traffic is 
communicated to a third party, courts generally do not require a 
warrant.137  While handing a letter to a US postal service worker, a 
government employee, does not permit the government to open it,138 
courts have persisted in allowing governments to review users’ 
activity logs.139  But, the present inquiry views privacy through the 
lens of contract law and does not make constitutional analyses and 
arguments, however numerous and important they may be.140 
The second problem is that proxies do not prevent traffic 
analysis because the tools for traffic analysis are advancing.  Social 
networks are mappable and trackable.141  A person’s social network 
 
 136.  See Schwarz, supra note 132, at 98-100 (detailing the use of virtual “footprints” and 
the use of proxy servers as they stored data in United States v. Hoke, the first major online 
securities fraud cases). 
 137.  See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), No. 
1:11-DM-3, 2011 WL 5508991, at *17 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (“Even if Petitioners had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP address information collected by Twitter, Petitioners 
voluntarily relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine. To 
access Twitter, Petitioners had to disclose their IP addresses to third parties.”); see also United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third 
party will not be betrayed.”). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“[Plaintiff] enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails vis-à-vis . . . his Internet 
Service Provider. Thus, government agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by compelling 
[his ISP] to turn over the emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.” 
(citation omitted)). The court made this holding based upon the analogy of emails and the 
Internet to the US postal system. Id. at 286. 
 138.  See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286 (“[T]he police may not storm the post office and 
intercept a letter . . . .”). 
 139.  Compare Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (detailing the role of a recipient of information and 
the loss of Fourth Amendment protections), with Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (distinguishing from 
an intended recipient and finding the ISP in the case was an intermediary). If we accept that an 
email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is manifest that agents of the government cannot 
compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of an email without triggering the Fourth 
Amendment. See generally Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286. An ISP is the intermediary through which 
emails must pass in order for email communication to be possible. Mike Masnick, Appeal Court 
Says Emails are Protected by the 4th Amendment, TECHDIRT (Dec. 14, 2010, 3:09 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101214/12144812273/appeals-court-says-emails-are-
protected-4th-amendment.shtml. 
 140.  See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 41, at 563, 563 n.5 (“The third-party doctrine is the 
Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate. It is the Lochner of search and seizure law, widely 
criticized as profoundly misguided. . . . A list of every article or book that has criticized the 
doctrine would make this the world's longest law review footnote.”). 
 141.  See Nate Anderson, How One Man Tracked Down Anonymous—And Paid a Heavy 
Price, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 10, 2011, 3:31 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/ 
anonymous/all/1 (“Aaron Barr [the CEO of security firm HBGary Federal] believed he had 
penetrated Anonymous . . . [the] loose hacker collective . . . . But matching their online identities 
to real-world names and locations proved daunting . . . . Barr . . . used social media data and 
subterfuge to map those names to three real people, two in California and one in New York.”). 
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and online contacts are serviceable digital fingerprints.142  The final 
problem is that protections from online service providers are negligible 
or impracticable.143  Each site has its own hidden and obscure “privacy 
policy,”144 which is in fact the terms under which the corporation will 
expropriate the users’ data.145  These privacy policies are 
take-it-or-leave-it propositions that are generally applicable; one size 
fits all members who access a site.146 
A consumer who wishes to protect her privacy through self-help 
must use encryption on her computer and must read and judge 
thousands of pages of EULAs for the programs she installs.147  She 
must use a browser that permits her to refuse cookies.  She must 
request secure connections wherever possible.148  She must use traffic 
analysis avoidance software, such as the TOR Onion Router, which 
bounces traffic all over the world before it exits from an anonymized 
node.149  She must use AdBlock Plus or some similar add-on to prevent 
banner advertisements from reporting her online traffic.150  If she 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“[H]olding that a defendant was not liable under the Stored Communications Act for disclosing 
personal information of which it was the intended recipient, even if the defendant was 
‘contractually bound by its privacy policy not to disclose . . . information’ and could be held liable 
for breach of contract for doing so.” (citing In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 
552, 560-61 (N.D. Tex. 2005)). 
 144.  See James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making 
Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 4 
(2005) (“[D]espite the proliferation of privacy policies online, consumers’ privacy interests may in 
fact be no better protected today than they were ten years ago. . . . [T]here may be little incentive 
for online businesses to adopt and adhere to strong privacy policies. It is the appearance of 
privacy that seems to matter most.”); see also Thurm & Kane, supra note 5 (“An examination of 
101 popular smartphone ‘apps’ . . . . reveal[s] the intrusive effort by online-tracking companies to 
gather personal data . . . . Forty-five of the 101 apps didn’t provide privacy policies on their 
websites . . . .”). 
 145.  See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Julia Angwin & Tom 
McGinty, Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703977004575393173432219064.html 
(“Dictionary.com . . . installed 168 tracking tools that didn't let users decline to be tracked, and 
121 tools that, according to their privacy statements, don't rule out collecting financial or health 
data.”). 
 146.  See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(describing the user agreement of PayPal). 
 147.  See Vance, supra note 55 (discussing the different antivirus companies); see also 
McAfee Consumer Products End User License Agreement, MCAFEE, http://home.mcafee.com/root/ 
aboutus.aspx?id=eula (last visited Dec. 28, 2011); Product License Agreements, SYMANTEC, 
http://www.symantec.com/about/profile/policies/eulas (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (linking to the 
numerous different products for consumer use and their license agreements).  
 148.  See Stecklow et al., supra note 128; see also Soghoian, supra note 84. 
 149.  See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 44 (2008). 
 150.  See Getting Started with Adblock Plus, ABLOCK PLUS, http://adblockplus.org/ 
en/getting_started (last visited Dec. 18, 2011) (describing Adblock Plus as a program that blocks 
advertisements on websites and can be modified with filters based on geographic location or 
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carries a cellular phone, she faces the same difficulties with the added 
problem that the mobile device tracks her everywhere she travels in 
real space.151  And even if she finds applications that block, delete, or 
redirect this information, recent scientific studies show that third 
parties can still track her.152 
Instead of permitting this unreasonable situation to persist, 
the law should permit a consumer to select a simple one-time browser 
option that expresses her unwillingness to be tracked.153  Courts could 
enforce that simple term the way they have been enforcing corporate 
contracts for years—favorably. 
II. OUTLINING ONLINE CONTRACTING LAW 
This Part discusses some trends in online contracting law, and 
isolates the impulses and analyses that have caused courts to 
systematically enforce corporate terms against consumers,154 while 
denying consumers the right to proffer their own terms against 
 
privacy preferences). But see Allowing Acceptable Ads in Adblock Plus, ADBLOCK PLUS, 
http://adblockplus.org/en/acceptable-ads (last visited Dec. 17, 2011) (discussing the switch to a 
changeable default setting where non-intrusive advertisements will be allowed where before they 
were not). 
 151.  See Julia Angwin & Scott Thurm, Judges Weigh Phone Tacking, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203733504577024092345458210.html 
(“The use of cellphone tracking by authorities is among the most common types of electronic 
surveillance, exceeding wiretaps and the use of GPS tracking, according to a survey of local, state 
and federal authorities by The Wall Street Journal.”); see also Valentino-Devries, supra note 44 
(detailing the steps that users can take to avoid being tracked online, such as browser setting 
changes and the different programs a user can download and manage). 
 152.  See Pedro G. Lean et al., Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A Usability Evaluation of 
Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising, CARNEGIE MELLON U. CYLAB (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab11017.pdf (“We present results of a 
45-participant laboratory study investigating the usability of tools to limit online behavioral 
advertising (OBA). . . . None of the nine tools we tested empowered study participants to 
effectively control tracking and behavioral advertising according to their personal preferences.” 
(emphasis added)); Valentino-Devries, supra note 44 (“If you opt out, you won't be shown ads tied 
to your browsing behavior from the member networks. But you'll still see ads, which may be 
placed based on criteria such as your location.”). 
 153.  See Nick Wingfield & Julia Angwin, Microsoft Adds Do-Not-Track Tool to Browser, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033639045762 
00981919667762.html (discussing Microsoft’s implementation of a Do-Not-Track feature); 
Mozilla: Do Not Track, MOZILLA, http://dnt.mozilla.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (noting that 
Mozilla Firefox includes a Do Not Track option); see also Allowing Acceptable Ads in Adblock 
Plus, supra note 150 (“In particular, we want to require that user’s privacy is respected 
(mandatory Do Not Track support). However, we are not yet in a position to enforce that 
requirement.”).  
 154.  See Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1635-36 (“Courts rarely look to the privacy settings or 
other elements of a website where users specify their privacy preferences because these settings 
and elements are typically not considered part of any contract or promise to the user.”); Knapp, 
supra note 6 (discussing how dominance of the drafter has become typical in contract law). 
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corporations.155  Even well-meaning courts cannot build contracts that 
protect consumer privacy using only corporate-drafted terms.156 
Before beginning the legal discussion, a statement of 
limitations is appropriate.  There is an extensive and developed 
literature on the various rules of contract formation, and the rules’ 
moral and economic ramifications.157  This Article does not replicate 
that research, rather, this Article mentions several example rules, 
laws, and cases for what they fail to accomplish: they do not generally 
operate to permit consumers to offer and enforce their own online 
contract terms.158  The rules mentioned are regularly used to construe 
only the corporation’s contractual terms.159  Courts only enforce the 
consumers’ preferences to the extent that the corporate contract 
embodies them: either actually (rare except for the price and quantity 
terms)160 or impliedly (by courts seeking to construe corporate contract 
terms in a pro-consumer fashion).161  This preference for 
corporate-drafted terms does not appear within the legal rules 
 
 155.  See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 21 (addressing the lack of consumer choice in 
accepting boilerplate language in standard form contracts). 
 156.  See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the 
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 
1169-70 (2010) (“One key element is the courts' effective elimination of the concept of agreement. 
There is no ‘meeting of the minds’ . . . . [C]ontracts are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In 
many situations, courts enforce contracts and changes in contract terms as long as the company 
notified the consumer . . . . Notice has replaced agreement as a crucial element of contract 
formation.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent 
Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law In Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 
1072 (2006) (“[T]he common law doctrine of unconscionability has proved difficult to define and 
has been rarely invoked undoubtedly because, other than in exceptional cases, it has been largely 
viewed as grossly interfering with the freedom of contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 66; Knapp, supra note 6; Lemley, supra note 6. 
 157.  See, e.g., Budnitz, supra note 156; Giesela Rühl, The Battle of the Forms: 
Comparative and Economic Observations, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 189 (2003); Amelia Rawls, 
Note, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 200 (2009). 
 158.  See Knapp, supra note 6. 
 159.  See id.; see also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“[A] consumer’s clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to contractual 
terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would 
signify assent to those terms . . . .”); Fisher v. MediSense, Inc., No. 95-1004-PFK, 1995 WL 
396613, at *6 (D. Kan. June 29, 1995) (“Undue influence is not proven, nor is a contract 
unconscionable, merely because a corporation drafts a contract.”). 
 160.  See, e.g., Cole v. Sandel Med. Indus., LLC, 413 F. App’x 683, 686-87 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“[I]t is clear that no contract was created between Cole and Sandel when she submitted her idea 
via the online submission form. . . . The agreement left open what price, if any, would be paid to 
Cole. Accordingly, the online submission form is not an enforceable agreement to compensate 
Cole for her idea.”). 
 161.  See, e.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-30; see Knapp, supra note 6. 
2012] “DO-NOT-TRACK” AS CONTRACT 575 
themselves, but rather in how those rules are actually applied.162  This 
opens the door for this Article’s argument: courts should bind 
corporations to consumer-expressed preferences in exactly the same 
way that courts have bound consumers to corporate-drafted contract 
terms. 
A. Corporate and Consumer Contracts under Online Contracting 
Regimes 
For online service transactions, courts use regular, 
common-law rules for contracting—often drawn from the Restatement 
of Contracts.163  The application of Restatement rules often favors 
corporations under the “mirror image”164 or common-law “last shot” 
rule,165 since the corporation is able to structure the transaction in 
such a way as to benefit itself.166  The Restatement contains some 
useful provisions for limiting corporate contractual  
overreaching—unconscionability,167 for example—by finding that a 
consumer is not bound by what she has not understood to be part of 
 
 162.  See Fisher, 1995 WL 396613, at *6 (“Undue influence is not proven, nor is a contract 
unconscionable, merely because a corporation drafts a contract.”); see also DiMatteo & Rich, 
supra note 156; Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1635-36. 
 163.  See e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Barnes also 
refers in her complaint and in her briefs to Yahoo’s ‘promise’ to remove the indecent profiles and 
her reliance thereon to her detriment. We construe such references to allege a cause of action 
under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981).”). 
 164.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1981). 
 165.  See Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 959 (E.D. Wis. 1999) 
(“‘[T]he terms of the party who sent the last form, typically the seller, would become the terms of 
the parties contract. This result was known as the “last shot rule.”’ Recognizing the growing 
impracticality of such rules in the modern economy, the drafters of the UCC ‘change[d] the 
common law in an attempt to conform contract law to modern day business transactions.’” 
(citations omitted)), aff’d, 241 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 166.  See O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (M.D. La. 2003); i.Lan 
Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336-38 (D. Mass. 2002); see also 
Barnes, supra note 114, at 239 (“[S]tandard form contracts signed by consumers pose problems 
that are not present in traditional, heavily negotiated agreements between merchants. These 
problems include the difference in bargaining strength between the parties to the contract, the 
adhesive nature of the terms, and the problem of terms not being read by consumers.” (footnote 
omitted)); Barnes, supra note 114, at 240 (“The consumer has no real choice in the matter of 
whether the terms will be part of the contract or not, and the forms are all one-sided and 
designed to benefit the drafting enterprise. The consumer is essentially put at the mercy of the 
form-drafting business.” (footnote omitted)); Rühl, supra note 157, at 212-13 (“[I]t becomes 
obvious that the last-shot rule, despite or because it provides a clear and strict rule . . . . 
encourages an extensive exchange of standard forms because both [companies] know that the 
other party's standard terms will control the complete transaction if the other party manages to 
make the last offer.”).  
 167.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208; see also David Horton, 
Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13, 13 (2011) (“The unconscionability 
doctrine has emerged as the primary check on drafter overreaching.”). 
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the contract.168  But unconscionability is fairly strongly 
circumscribed,169 especially after the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.170 
Since software is often sold off the shelves in boxes, some 
courts have applied Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2 to 
e-commercial sales of software, even when the goods in question are in 
fact licenses to use software products.171  And, of course, many online 
transactions are simply sales of real goods over the Internet.  Thus, for 
cases involving sales of goods online, or retail sales of software, courts 
often use UCC Article 2, which covers sales of goods.  UCC 2-207, the 
famed battle of the forms provision, resolves competing terms in the 
parties’ offer and acceptance.172 
UCC 2-207 offers a range of possible interpretations that 
generate rules for contract formation.  These interpretive rules in turn 
determine which of a competing set of contract terms the court will 
deem operative.173  As between businesses, some cases resolve 
 
 168.  See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 
1965); see also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 169.  See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 156, at 1068-72. 
 170.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that 
California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable was pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the FAA’s goal of 
enforcing arbitration clauses). AT&T had an arbitration clause in its mobile phone contract that 
waived class action suits by consumers. The Concepcions, consumers who purchased the AT&T 
plan in order to get the free phone, filed suit against AT&T alleging that AT&T fraudulently 
charged them tax on the phone, because AT&T had stated in its advertisement that consumers 
would get a free phone with the purchase of a plan. Under prior California precedent, waiver of 
class arbitration in consumer contracts of adhesion was unconscionable in certain circumstances 
and therefore unenforceable. In addition, the FAA did not preempt California’s state law 
prohibition of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); 
see also Horton, supra note 167, at 14 (“Justice Thomas implies that nobody can apply 
unconscionability to arbitration clauses. . . . Because Justice Thomas provided the swing vote in 
Concepcion, and invited parties to address the link between §§ 2 and 4 in the future, he ensured 
that unconscionability’s viability will become a flashpoint in the arbitration wars.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 171.  Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 786 
n.17 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 172.  See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992 
(7th Cir. 2008) (“Terms in form contracts are routinely enforced under the UCC, unless a ‘battle 
of the forms’ occurs . . . or the term would be unconscionable . . . .”). 
 173.  See PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, LP v. Christy Refractories, LLC, 225 F.3d 974, 977 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (“Applying Article 2 of the . . . (UCC), the district court held that, because . . . 
acceptance was expressly conditional upon . . . assent to additional terms . . . no contract was 
formed under UCC § 2–207(1). The district court alternatively determined that, even if . . . 
customer acknowledgment was a valid acceptance under § 2–207(1), the provisions of § 2–207(2) 
prevented incorporation of . . . added terms because the[re] . . . was a material alteration of the 
contract. Finally, the district court held that the additional arbitration terms could not qualify as 
a supplemental term under § 2–207(3) given the parties' limited course of dealing.” (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted)). 
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differing terms in the offer and acceptance by merging non-conflicting 
unimportant terms under 2-207(2).174  Other cases apply a judicial 
gloss through the so-called “knockout rule” to eliminate differing 
terms and fill any resulting gaps with commercial default rules.175  As 
between a merchant and non-merchant, UCC 2-207(2), at least 
technically, creates a “first shot rule,” which courts occasionally 
interpret to favor consumers—who make the “first shot” by initiating 
a purchase.176  More often, UCC 2-207(2) operates to favor 
corporations as firing the “first shot”,177 since the corporate EULA or 
Terms of Use are the first website terms that the user encounters.178 
The real problem, though, lies not with whether courts enforce 
corporate terms as the “first shot,” or enforce corporate terms as the 
“last shot.”  The issue is that a significant number of courts are 
applying a de facto “only shot” rule.179  That is, by not recognizing or 
 
 174.  See, e.g., Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“‘[T]he burden of proving the materiality of the alteration must fall on the party that 
opposes inclusion.’ This is so because the UCC presumes that between merchants additional 
terms will be included in a contract. Thus, ‘if neither party introduced any evidence, the 
[proposed additional term] would, by the plain language of § 2-207(2), become part of the 
contract.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
 175.  See, e.g., SCM Grp., USA, Inc. v. Custom Designs & Mfg. Co., 89 F. App'x 779, 780 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Pennsylvania Superior Court has issued an opinion in which it holds that 
the ‘knockout rule’ applies to contracts governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. . . . As such, we hold 
that neither the original terms nor the handwritten changes, which were obviously ‘different’ and 
not simply ‘additional’ terms, control the issue of acceptance. Instead, we look to the U.C.C. to 
supply the default terms of acceptance.” (citation omitted)). 
 176.  See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) (“In typical 
consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the offeree.”); DeFontes v. 
Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1067 (R.I. 2009) (“The U.C.C. creates the assumption that, unless 
circumstances unambiguously demonstrate otherwise, the buyer is the offeror and the seller is 
the offeree.”); see also Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 956 (E.D. Wis. 
1999) (“[T]he purchase order usually is the first document having the legal attributes of an offer.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Gulf States Utils. Co. v. NEI Peebles Elec. Prods., Inc., 819 F. 
Supp. 538, 549 (M.D. La. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted))), aff’d, 241 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
 177.  DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1071 (“After reviewing the case law pertaining to so-called 
‘shrinkwrap’ agreements, we are satisfied that the ProCD line of cases is better reasoned and 
more consistent with contemporary consumer transactions. It is simply unreasonable to expect a 
seller to apprise a consumer of every term and condition at the moment he or she makes a 
purchase. . . . We therefore decline to adopt the minority view, as urged by plaintiffs, that a 
contract is fully formed when a buyer orders a product and the seller accepts payment and either 
ships or promises to ship. Instead, formation occurs when the consumer accepts the full terms 
after receiving a reasonable opportunity to refuse them.” (emphasis added)). 
 178.  See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Each WoW player must read and accept Blizzard's End User License Agreement (‘EULA’) and 
Terms of Use (‘ToU’) on multiple occasions. . . . The ToU pertains to the online service, so a 
player agrees to it both when creating an account and upon first connecting to the online 
service.”), amended by denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011). 
 179.  See DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1071 (“[W]e are satisfied that the ProCD line of cases is 
better reasoned and more consistent with contemporary consumer transactions. . . . [F]ormation 
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enforcing consumer expressions of preference as true contractual 
terms, or by finding that the corporate version of the deal is the only 
version,180 these courts avoid the transaction costs they believe 
consumer-proffered contracts would present.181  Or, to the extent that 
a court is sympathetic to consumer concerns, courts continue to try to 
protect consumer interests by interpreting only the corporate contract 
terms.182  In other words, whatever the test, the corporate terms 
govern. 
This tilted architecture is built upon the line of cases including 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg183 and Hill v. Gateway.184  These cases argue 
that the consumer simply had not offered any contractual terms that 
the court could consider—that, in essence, the corporation had fired 
the “only shot.”185  Other courts widely follow the approach taken in 
these two cases.186  Courts hold that consumers have not offered their 
own terms, ostensibly because such terms were not in writing, and 
because any writing would be superseded by the following corporate 
contract that came with the shipped product.187 
 
occurs when the consumer accepts the full terms after receiving a reasonable opportunity to 
refuse them.”).  
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. (“It is simply unreasonable to expect a seller to apprise a consumer of every term 
and condition at the moment he or she makes a purchase.”). 
 182.  See id.; see also Barnes, supra note 114, at 239-40; Horton, supra note 167; Knapp, 
supra note 6.  
 183.  ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Our case has only 
one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant. . . . What then does the current version of the UCC have to 
say? We think that the place to start is § 2-204(1): . . . . A vendor, as master of the offer, may 
invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes 
acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as 
acceptance. And that is what happened.”). 
 184.  Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding ProCD to 
be controlling, specifically the power to control the offer and set its terms). “Plaintiffs ask us to 
limit ProCD to software, but where’s the sense in that? ProCD is about the law of contract, not 
the law of software.” Id. at 1149. 
 185.  See id. at 1148-49; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (“A vendor, as master of the offer, may 
invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes 
acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as 
acceptance.”). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) (“[T]he 
Seventh Circuit provided no explanation for its conclusion that ‘the vendor is the master of the 
offer.’ . . . In typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the 
offeree.” (citations omitted)). In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook looked to UCC § 2-204(1) and 
determined that contracts can be formed in a variety of ways, and having a splash screen was 
one of them. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.  
 186.  DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1069-71 (“The defendants argue that ProCD represents the 
majority view and we have found considerable support for their contention.”).  
 187.  See id. at 1069 (“[A]dopting ProCD analysis but noting shrinkwrap agreement 
explicitly instructed consumers ‘IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THESE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS, PROMPTLY RETURN * * * TO THE PLACE OF PURCHASE AND YOUR 
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Moreover, in the Hill and ProCD approach, courts often go to 
significant lengths to reinterpret the moment of contract formation to 
ensure that the corporate drafter is the “offeror,” and the consumer 
accepts the corporate-proffered terms.188  In Hill v. Gateway, the court 
determined that the consumer did not offer, in the legal sense, to buy 
a computer when he called Gateway and ordered a computer.189  That 
would have made the consumer’s terms govern, since Gateway 
promptly accepted the offer by shipping the computer, as is permitted 
under UCC 2-206.190  Indeed, under the “first shot” rule of 2-207(2), 
had the court deemed the Hills the offerors, all additional terms to the 
original agreement would be mere proposals for modification and not 
part of the contract.  But the court deemed that the Hills were not the 
offerors, and also found that the parties did not form a contract even 
when the computer arrived with the contract enclosed.191  Rather, the 
court found that the Hills, by not returning the computer, accepted 
Gateway’s contract terms nearly a month afterward.192  The idea that 
there was no contract as of the point of the initial telephone order is 
odd.193  The parties had agreed on a sale and a price,194 and would 
have had a cause of action if one party had not performed.195  But 
courts continue to shuffle offer and acceptance until they come to the 
unfortunate result: the corporate contractual terms prevail. 
 
PURCHASE PRICE WILL BE REFUNDED . . . .’” (citing M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline 
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 308 (Wash. 2000))).  
 188.  See id. at 1067-70. But see Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (“The Court is not 
persuaded that Kansas or Missouri courts would follow the Seventh Circuit reasoning in Hill and 
ProCD. In each case the Seventh Circuit concluded without support that UCC § 2-207 was 
irrelevant because the cases involved only one written form.”). 
 189.  Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1150 (“The question in ProCD was not whether terms were 
added to a contract after its formation, but how and when the contract was formed—in 
particular, whether a vendor may propose that a contract of sale be formed, not in the store (or 
over the phone) with the payment of money or a general ‘send me the product,’ but after the 
customer has had a chance to inspect both the item and the term. . . . At oral argument the Hills 
propounded still another distinction: the box containing ProCD’s software displayed a notice that 
additional terms were within, while the box containing Gateway's computer did not. The 
difference is functional, not legal.”). 
 190.  See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2003) (“[A]n order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or 
current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or 
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods . . . .”).  
 191.  Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1148-50.  
 192.  Id. at 1150 (“By keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s 
offer . . . .”). 
 193.  See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b). 
 194.  See id. § 2-201 (establishing partial payment as grounds for satisfying the Statute of 
Frauds). 
 195.  See id. § 2-206 (inviting acceptance of offer by any means, including shipping). 
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Despite this, consumers sometimes win contractual disputes 
with corporations.196  But their victories only highlight the problem.  
Because courts only look at corporate-drafted terms even when they 
are attempting to protect consumer interests, consumer victories are 
one-shot, flash-in-the-pan victories that merely cause the corporation 
to rewrite its EULA or TOS to avoid the prior result in future cases.197  
Corporate victories such as Concepcion, however, are wide ranging 
and permanent.  When a court validates and enforces a corporate 
term, like one barring class actions and requiring arbitration, other 
corporations include those terms in their contracts and then courts 
subsequently enforce those terms against more consumers.198  In this 
way, consumer victories are limited to the individual case, while 
corporate victories redound to the benefit of all corporate drafters.  
Focusing on corporate-drafted contracts to protect consumer rights 
does not provide sufficient protection to consumers. 
This one-way ratchet only works, however, because consumers 
cannot effectively contribute terms to their own online contracts.  
They are merely permitted to choose which corporate-drafted contract 
will bind them.  When a consumer buys a product online, she selects 
the product, and then the seller hands her a set of inalterable terms 
and conditions.  She may refuse to purchase, or may accept the terms.  
She may not, however, add or change the terms or conditions.  There 
is no drop-down box for that. 
Indeed, some courts may not enforce consumer-proffered terms 
even if offered in writing and in the form of a contract.  As noted 
above, even if a court holds that a consumer had offered written 
contractual terms, it can easily alter which terms are considered 
definitive by changing who is the offeror and who is the acceptor in 
favor of the corporation.199  Alternatively, a court may exclude 
consumer terms under the parol evidence rule (if the consumer’s 
communication of terms took place prior to, or contemporaneously 
with, the transaction) or under anti-modification clause analysis (if 
the communication of terms came after whichever moment the court 
deems that the corporation’s contract excluding modification became 
operative).200  In this way, the law excludes the consumer from the 
 
 196.  See also discussion supra note 185. 
 197.  See Budnitz, supra note 156, at 1172; Knapp, supra note 6. 
 198.  See Budnitz, supra note 156, at 1171-72; Knapp, supra note 6, at 117-18. 
 199.  See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069-71 (R.I. 2009); see also Budnitz, 
supra note 156, at 1172. 
 200.  U.C.C. § 2-209(2). 
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contracting process if she communicates her terms before, during, or 
after the delivery of the corporate terms.201 
A return to the basic contract principle that consumers may 
offer contract terms could resolve deep difficulties in the law of online 
contracting, and could have ramifications well beyond the original 
“do-not-track” context.  A thought experiment may help define how the 
proposal of this Article departs from standard practice, and how much 
of a difference a bit of consumer contracting could make.  After 
Concepcion, many believe that several forms of consumer class actions 
face significant additional legal hurdles.202  Courts will hold that 
consumers gave up their right to go to court because of 
corporate-drafted and court-enforced arbitration clauses.  Imagine, 
however, that a consumer includes a full retention-of-rights clause in 
her browser handshake protocol.  That is, suppose that the consumer 
communicated to the corporation, at the moment of their first online 
interaction: “If you want to deal with me, you should know that I 
reserve all rights and remedies, and specifically reject any arbitration 
clause.”  If courts were to enforce such a contractual term, the 
non-trivial concerns raised by Concepcion would simply cease to 
exist.203  Restoring power to the consumer to draft and offer contract 
terms would do much to ameliorate the problem of consumer 
powerlessness in online contracting. 
Giving consumers power to proffer, and not merely accept 
automated contract terms online is not a radical proposal.  It is easy to 
overlook that in the one place where corporations do permit consumers 
to communicate contractual preference—the quantity term in an 
online sales contract—the enforcement of that term is simply a matter 
of course.  The consumer gets the number of items she ordered.  
 
 201.  See Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1283, 1307 n.121 (2005) (“For contract claims, cases [where] . . . consumer's act of 
breaking the shrinkwrap is deemed to be assent to the governing terms, form the foundation for 
courts’ analysis. The trend among courts is to enforce such licenses, so long as the consumer has 
a right to reject the terms by returning the product.”). “[C]ourts . . . have broadly construed 
license agreements in favor of licensors – even when it is questionable whether the licensee has 
manifested assent to particular notices provided by the licensor.” Id. at 1306-07. 
 202.  See Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class 
Actions?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/ 
after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions (noting that class action suits 
are threatened by the result in Concepcion). 
 203.  See Horton, supra note 167 (“The unconscionability doctrine has emerged as the 
primary check on drafter overreaching.”); Knapp, supra note 6; see also Stephen E. Friedman, A 
Pro-Congress Approach to Arbitration and Unconscionability, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 53, 
54-57 (2011) (“This Essay . . . responds to some of Professor Horton’s objections to my 
position. . . . Concepcion invites us to ask whether unconscionability really is within § 2 at all. 
That is, rather than put unconscionability into a tiny cage in which it can barely move, why not 
put it out of its misery altogether in the context of arbitration provisions . . . .”). 
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Outside of the consumer context, courts routinely give legal effect to 
buyer-side machine-automated contract terms.204  When a computer in 
a business-to-business transaction orders a product—for example in 
the extremely common practice of Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI)—the buyer and seller have usually worked out the terms and 
conditions in advance as part of an overall EDI agreement.205  
Machines make the contracts, and the terms of the purchasing 
machine’s contract are as binding upon the seller as the terms of the 
selling machine’s contract are upon the buyer.206 
Likewise, when one website wishes to exclude robots and 
scrapers from its service, the website posts a file called “robots.txt” 
that includes the restrictions on scraping.207  These restrictions are 
readable by other people’s scrapers and agents, and are quite binding: 
if the scraper continues despite the preferences expressed in the 
robots.txt file, courts have analogized the resulting server load to 
trespassing on someone’s land without permission.208  Thus, 
automated contracts are enforced.  Buyer-side contracts are enforced.  
Buyer-side automated contracts are enforced.  But consumer buyer-
side automated contracts—such as a contractual do-not-track term 
included in a browser—are often either ignored or swept under the rug 
as not comprising part of the contract. 
A critical question to answer is why courts disfavor consumer 
contract terms in the online context.  First, courts may be crudely 
attempting to streamline online contracting, or at least to simplify 
their work in construing online contracts.  Courts like corporate 
contracts.  Corporations draft contracts in legal language, in a format 
that the court recognizes, and with strong mechanisms of acceptance, 
like clicking an “I Accept” button, or scrolling to the bottom of the legal 
document.  Thus, in order to keep things simple, courts have turned to 
 
 204.  See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 107(a) (2002); see also Baney Corp. 
v. Agilysys NV, LLC, 773 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2011) (“Maryland law governs 
interpretation of the contracts at issue in this case. The Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (“UCITA”) has been enacted by the Maryland legislature and both contracts are 
covered by its terms.” (citations omitted)); KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., No. 
CV 06-3013(JS)(AKT), 2006 WL 1720461, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2006) (“[T]he Service 
Agreement for Electronic Fund Transfers dated July 11, 1998, and the Key Exchange Services 
Amendment Agreement dated December 10, 2004 (collectively the ‘Agreements’) clearly define 
the rights and duties of the parties.”).  
 205.  See Keybank, 2006 WL 1720461, at *4. 
 206.  See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 107(a). 
 207.  See Zittrain, supra note 24, at 100-03. 
 208.  See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(“eBay argues that BE's use was unauthorized and intentional. eBay is correct. BE does not 
dispute that it employed an automated computer program to connect with and search eBay's 
electronic database. . . . BE argues that it cannot trespass eBay's web site because the site is 
publicly accessible. BE's argument is unconvincing.”). 
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corporate contracts as the sole expression of contractual preferences 
within an e-commercial case.209  A consumer’s preferences are rarely 
so cleanly stated.  They might consist of statements made during the 
purchasing process, or even tacit understandings of the parties. 
While in each individual case it may be simpler to enforce the 
corporate terms, the aggregate effect of this practice is to shift large 
transaction costs onto consumers.  While a judge must read only one 
contract in a case, the result of the corporate-contract-focused 
interpretive approach is that privacy-minded consumers must read 
thousands of different online contracts drafted in extremely technical 
language.210  And if, as this Article suggests, there is a way to create 
compact, streamlined consumer-offered contract terms—such as a 
“do-not-track” flag set in a browser—the court’s judicial economy 
preference for corporate-drafted contracts should give way to a more 
even-handed approach. 
Some contracts that the law calls “standardized” are in fact 
obfuscatory.211  Other “standardized” contracts are truly 
standardized—that is, they convey more information to the user by 
virtue of the fact that they offer the standard deal.212  For this latter 
kind of standardized contract, the consumer need not read the 
contract in every case, since she knows she is getting the standard 
deal.  True standardization helps convey information.213  What courts 
dislike are not true standard contracts, but precisely those contracts 
that are not standardized—that is, that contain some term or 
condition that would unfairly surprise the consumer.214 
However, even courts that understand that standardized 
contracts can reduce information costs215 have, not without irony, 
 
 209.  See Barnes, supra note 114, at 245-46 (“Under the duty-to-read rule, if a consumer 
signs a form contract, the law has traditionally stated that it is reasonable for the merchant to 
conclude that the consumer has thereby given her assent to the deal.”). 
 210.  See Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1642 (“It has become a truism that virtually no one 
reads standard-form online agreements.”); Nehf, supra note 144 (“[D]espite the proliferation of 
privacy policies online, consumers’ privacy interests may in fact be no better protected today 
than they were ten years ago.”). 
 211.  See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1237, 
1273 (2007). 
 212.  Id. at 1244. 
 213.  Cf. Eric J. Feigin, Note, Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and 
Their Legal Implications, 56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 902 (2004) (“Higher-level protocols, such as those 
utilized in most web interactions, involve exchanges that should be considered express consent: 
the formation of a legally binding contract.”). 
 214.  See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1450 (2009). 
 215.  See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Writing 
provides benefits for both sides of commercial transactions. Customers as a group are better off 
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refused to take the last step of enforcing consumer-side standard 
terms.  Automated contracts have been around for years,216 and while 
courts continue wrestling with the problems raised by the 
mid-nineties automation of corporate-side contracting over the 
Internet, commerce has already moved on to new frontiers.217  As 
noted above, one of the inalterable features of this new commercial 
landscape is that computers automatically offer and accept 
contracts.218  Automated contracting is the backbone of modern 
commercial systems, from machine parts to groceries to vast swaths of 
financial markets. 
Transaction costs would be at their lowest if both consumers 
and corporations could offer standard contracts automatically, 
whether through the consumer’s web browser or the corporation’s web 
server.  Corporations benefit from legal enforcement of their 
web-server-proffered contracts.  When a consumer purchases an item 
from Amazon.com, she does not interact with a live person.  The 
machine is the agent or instrumentality of the corporate contractual 
counterparty.219  In exactly the same fashion, consumers should 
benefit from legal enforcement of their web-browser-proffered 
contracts.  It is neither complex nor costly for corporations to refuse to 
do business with customers who offer contractual terms the 
corporation does not wish to accept.  Of course, what will likely 
happen is the opposite: the corporation will choose to do business with 
the consumer,220 and in so doing, a court should deem that the 
 
when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use instead a 
simple approve-or-return device.”). 
 216.  Cf. Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting 
Toward a Global Environment, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 31, 31 (1992) (“With the growth in the 
use of electronic communications technologies to communicate important business and trade 
information, the size of the earth . . . is rapidly shrinking.”). 
 217.  Id. at 31-32 (“[T]he drafting . . . of several international codifications . . . . though 
progressive, ha[s] failed to keep pace with the quickly changing face of international business 
transactions.”). 
 218.  Id. at 33 (“Companies are increasingly resorting to electronic communications 
technologies like electronic data interchange (EDI) because of the increased speed of 
transmission, reduction in error in commercial exchanges of data, reduced need for paper 
documents, elimination of repetitive computer input, reduced inventory needs, faster response to 
business demand, reduced time to market products, and significant overall cost reductions.”). 
 219.  Of course, the programmer who set the machine up, or her superiors who told her 
what to code, are the real legal counterparties, but that does not matter for this analysis. 
 220.  See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the 
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 275-78 (2011) (discussing the rise in privacy concerns by 
consumers and the media, and the change in policies by corporations to address this demand); 
Doug Gross, Apple: Apps Need ‘Explicit Approval’ Before Collecting User Contacts, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/tech/mobile/apple-user-contacts/index.html (last updated Feb. 22, 
2012) (“Apple on Wednesday said it will start requiring mobile apps to get explicit permission 
from iPhone and iPad owners before the apps collect and store information about users' personal 
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corporation accepted the consumer’s terms.  The next Section explores 
the potential of deeming automated consumer-side terms enforceable. 
B. A Better Direction: Consumer Online Contracts 
Courts should apply the same rules to enforce consumer-offered 
online contract terms as they do to enforce corporate-offered terms.  
Consumer privacy preferences would, under this approach, be 
expressed as standardized, simple, machine-readable settings set in 
the web browser client.  This solution is at least as good as, and likely 
far better than, the practice of corporations offering lengthy and 
obfuscatory contracts via their web servers.  An enforceable 
do-not-track flag is a perfect place to start.  It is an absolutely clear 
expression of the consumer’s unwillingness to sell her private 
information, offered at the first and every subsequent point of contact 
between consumer and corporation.  While comprehension costs to 
consumers of reading and keeping up with thousands of corporate 
contracts are very high, comprehension costs to corporations of 
complying with a simple and binary machine-readable flag are 
absolutely zero.  Corporations can set their web servers to respond to 
the flag and respect the consumer’s preference, or choose not do 
business with her, as the corporation chooses. 
The proposal advanced here is not a vision of individuated, 
dickered, or particularized consumer contracting, but rather a vision 
of standardized, mass-market, consumer-proffered contract terms.  
This is an approach with a successful track record.  For example, in 
the intellectual property context, consumers can use Creative 
Commons copyright licenses (CC licenses) for content that they create 
and upload to online sites.221  CC licenses give content creators control 
of their work in the form of short, clear, and standardized license 
terms.222  The result is a copyright system that is characterized by 
simplicity, low transaction costs, and equalization in legal power for 
 
contacts. . . . The statement came after a week of revelations that popular social tools like 
Twitter and Path were doing just that . . . .”).  
 221.  See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter CREATIVE COMMONS] (providing for a standard option set 
of contractual licenses that have revolutionized online exchanges). For example, an aspiring web 
developer may pick a Creative Commons (CC) license that allows others, including corporations, 
to use their work but only for non-commercial use and with attribution, or freely with only 
attribution required. 
 222.  See Severine Dusollier, Contract Options for Individual Artists: Master’s Tools v. 
The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271, 272 (2006) 
(discussing the purpose of Creative Commons to address the over expansion of copyright and 
need to protect both future creators and users of copyrighted works). 
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consumers with corporations through simple contracts223 that courts 
will enforce.224  And to the extent that a consumer-proffered contract 
contains a non-standard or non-machine-readable surprise, courts can 
strike unconscionable terms from the contract on the same grounds 
and to the same extent that they do (or equally often do not) for 
unfairly surprising terms in corporate contracts.  But in this case, 
there can be no surprise in a single check box indicating that a 
consumer does not wish to be tracked. 
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the contract terms 
that consumers offer will be simple and standardized.  Consumers 
often merely expect the standard deal, which involves price, quantity, 
and standard quality.  Consumers do not need or want most of the fine 
legal technicalities that corporations do; they desire only essential 
terms. 
Underneath the basic inclination of consumers to add a breath 
of needed simplicity to legal transactions lies a deeper point.  
Consumer-side contracts can be crafted to be not only simple but also 
modular and standardized.  A good model here again is the CC 
licenses.225  CC users select pre-drafted standardized licenses that 
govern the use of their content through a simple menu of options.226  
The licenses respond to user desires and do not add needless 
boilerplate.  Finally, the licenses are undoubtedly enforceable 
consumer contracts offered by and responsive to the needs of the 
individual rather than the corporation.227 
Other scholars have proposed to use CC licensing as a broader 
solution to the problem of consumer data privacy.228  This Article does 
not propose so broad an initiative here.  Rather, it notes that browsers 
currently permit a user to express her preference to not be tracked.229  
This option is simple, binary, and machine-readable.  There is no 
reason, other than willful ignorance, for a company to track a user 
who has made use of such a browser option.  Certainly, the argument 
that consumer-proffered contracts will complicate online contracting 
 
 223.  See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online 
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 720-21, n.224 (2010) (“The Creative 
Commons . . . licenses are legally enforceable in both contract and property.”).  
 224.  Id. at n.224. 
 225.  See CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 221. 
 226.  See id. 
 227.  See Dusollier, supra note 222 at 272. 
 228.  See Patricia Sánchez Abril, supra note 223, at 720-23 (2010). 
 229.  See Wingfield & Angwin, supra note 153; see also Ryan Singel, Google Holds Out 
Against ‘Do Not Track,’ CNN (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/04/18/google. 
chrome.wired/index.html; Mozilla: Do Not Track, supra note 153 (noting that Mozilla Firefox 
includes a Do-Not-Track option).   
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fails in the face of such a simple and standard expression of 
preference. 
III. THE DO-NOT-TRACK OPTION 
A. The FTC’s Proposal 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), sensing the 
inadequacies of the current legal framework, has voiced some support 
for a federally enforced do-not-track option.230  The FTC has already 
had broad success with an analogous program: the Federal 
Do-Not-Call Registry.231  This list helped to curb direct-call 
harassment by call centers because it permitted consumers to make a 
simple, one-time, enforceable election to not be contacted.232 
Companies reliant on unchecked use of consumer information 
have broadly opposed the FTC’s proposal of a do-not-track 
enforcement regime,233 just as telemarketers resisted the Do-Not-Call 
list. 234  Whether these lobbying efforts will succeed remains an open 
question.  It is certainly true that a FTC-mandated do-not-track option 
should not be run in the same fashion as the Do-Not-Call list. 
The Federal Do-Not-Call list requires users to register their 
telephone numbers with the government.235  The government then 
maintains this central registry and telemarketers must scrub their 
contact lists by comparison to the central database on a regular 
 
 230.  See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, F.T.C. Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online 
Users, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/business/media/02privacy. 
html. 
 231.  See Nils Kongshaug, Do-Not-Call List a Success . . . Even for Telemarketers, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Business/story?id=1037365. 
 232.  See Reporter Resources: The National Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/dnc.shtm (last visited October 2, 2011) [hereinafter 
National DNC Registry] (describing the role and certain limitations of the Do Not Call Registry). 
 233.  See David Goldman, FTC ‘Do Not Track’ Plan Would Cripple Some Web Giants, 
CNNMONEY (Dec. 3, 2010, 10:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/02/technology/ftc_do_not_ 
track/index.htm (identifying numerous industry leaders, for example Google, who are opposed to 
“do not track” because of unforeseen security problems and loss of advertising revenues). But see 
Casey Newton, Google Agrees to Do-Not-Track Button, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2012, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/23/BULK1NBLSQ.DTL&type=tech 
(“Google . . . became the latest Internet giant to support adding a do-not-track button to its web 
browser. No time frame was set for changing the Chrome browser to include a do-not-track 
feature . . . .”); Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Emily Steel, White House to Push Privacy Bill, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870466260457 
6202971768984598.html (“[A] group of about 30 online-advertising companies is preparing to 
break with most of the industry and support a proposal for a single do-not-track tool.”). 
 234.  See Do-Not-Call Back on the Line, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:36 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/07/tech/main561876.shtml (describing industry efforts 
to stop the Do Not Call list). 
 235.  See National DNC Registry, supra note 232. 
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basis.236  A do-not-track option could not work in the same way, nor 
should it.  The “telephone number” at issue could be one of two 
options, both of which present difficulties.  The identifying number 
could be a special government-issued cookie that identified the user237 
or it could be the user’s IP address.238  The IP address option will not 
work, since most ISPs assign IP addresses on a dynamic basis, 
changing any given user’s IP address regularly.  And those ISPs that 
allocate static IP addresses, such as Sprint,239 create enormous 
tracking problems for consumers.240  The government cookie option 
raises even more concern, because in order to not be tracked by 
corporations, the user must reveal herself in a permanent fashion to 
the government.241  One option is unworkable, the other unacceptable. 
B. A Better Alternative: Do-Not-Track Browser-Level Options 
The simple expedient of enforcing a browser-level do-not-track 
option would solve the above-mentioned problems.  A do-not-track 
option in the browser does not rely on an IP address, since the user 
can express her preference not to be tracked no matter what Internet 
address she is using.242  And it does not raise issues of government 
intrusion into privacy, since the government would not have to 
maintain a central database of special tracking cookies ostensibly used 
to tell corporations not to track consumers.243 
 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  See Tracking the Trackers: Our Method, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703977004575393121635952084.html (“HTML 
cookies are small text files, installed on a user's computer by a website, that assign the user's 
computer a unique identity and can track the user's movements on a site.”). 
 238.  See Keith Black, Note, Technical Knockout: How Mixed Martial Arts Will Change 
Copyright Enforcement on the Web, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 739, 755 n.106 
(2011) (“An IP address is a unique user-identification number that is automatically assigned to 
the user.”). 
 239.  See supra text accompanying note 109. 
 240.  See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The 
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 50 n.80 (2003) (“A 
dynamic IP address is analogous to a ‘temporary phone number[,] for the duration of that 
Internet session or for some other specified amount of time. Once the user disconnects from the 
Internet, their [sic] dynamic IP address goes back into the IP address pool so it can be assigned 
to another user.’” (alterations in original)).  
 241.  See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic 1977) (1949) (describing a 
fictional era in which the government watches and regulates one’s every action). 
 242.  See, e.g., Mozilla: Do Not Track, supra note 153 (instructing users how to enable Do 
Not Track). 
 243.  This is because the user and the website would handle the do-not-track option: the 
government would have no direct role. Compare id. (discussing how a user can enable Do Not 
Track in her browser), with National DNC Registry, supra note 232 (illustrating how the FTC 
operates its do-not-call registry by compiling and maintaining registered telephone numbers and 
reporting the numbers to telemarketing companies). 
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A simple and successful approach would be for the FTC to use 
its section 5 authority to stop unfair business practices.244  This would 
require businesses to respect a consumer’s expressed preference not to 
be tracked.245  As is too often the case in politics, however, what 
should be done may not be done.  And even if the FTC were to adopt 
do-not-track as an enforceable rule, the FTC has few resources 
available for direct enforcement.246  An individual’s ability to stop 
corporate surveillance therefore may depend on the availability of 
other enforceable rights, such as those proposed here. 
Furthermore, the FTC’s section 5 authority is restricted to 
unfair business practices.247  Courts have read this authority quite 
broadly.248  Nevertheless, corporations will certainly assert that 
following the terms of their own privacy policies and terms of use does 
not constitute an unfair business practice.249  From the corporation’s 
perspective, the consumer has agreed to unlimited intrusion and 
untrammeled surveillance merely by using an online site or service.  
Changing the law’s default preference for corporate contracts is 
important250 because the FTC has traditionally been much more 
willing to step in on behalf of consumers when a company violates 
 
 244.  See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006) (granting the FTC the 
power to regulate unfair trade practices); see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm (last updated July 2008) [hereinafter FTC: A Brief 
Overview] (describing the FTC’s authority under section 5 of the FTCA). 
 245.  FTC: A Brief Overview, supra note 244. 
 246.  See id. (“[E]ven where the Commission determines through adjudication or 
rulemaking that a practice is unfair or deceptive, the Commission must still seek the aid of a 
court to obtain civil penalties or consumer redress for violations of its orders to cease and desist 
or trade regulation rules.”); see also Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 220. 
 247.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful.”). 
 248.  See FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 
1968) (“Congress, in 1914, enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act. The then broad purpose 
of the Act was to prevent unfair methods of competition in their inception. By the Wheeler-Lea 
amendment, Congress, in 1938, broadened section 5 of the Act and extended the authority of the 
Commission to eliminate unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce without regard to 
competition.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 249.  See Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862-865 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“Unfair acts are those that ‘offend[] an established public policy’ or are ‘immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.’ . . . [D]efendant . . . 
argued . . . plaintiff’s contractual claims should be dismissed because the provisions of the 
privacy policy maintained by defendant expressly provide that no liability will result due to a 
third party's unauthorized access of defendant's computer system . . . .” (alteration in original)); 
see also Adam R. Bialek & Scott M. Smedresman, Internet Risk Management: A Guide to 
Limiting Risk Through Web Site Terms and Proactive Enforcement, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
L.J. 1 (2008) (describing how privacy policies and terms of use statements can limit risks to 
companies that operate websites). 
 250.  See Kesan & Shah, supra note 45. 
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contractual promises with consumers.251  Since corporations rarely 
make enforceable promises regarding consumer privacy, FTC 
involvement in consumer privacy has been anemic.252 
There is, however, a potential upside to this dynamic.  If courts 
enforce consumer-offered automated standardized contract terms, 
then companies will indeed be violating the promises they have made 
to consumers if they violate a do-not-track term.  If corporations 
violate an actual contractual promise regarding privacy, the FTC will 
have more opportunity to become legally involved.  What was once a 
rarity may become commonplace; the FTC will actually protect 
consumers from corporate overreach.253 
Indeed, the FTC does step in where corporate transactions 
violate actual contractual promises made to consumers regarding 
privacy.  In F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, the FTC stepped in to 
prevent the sale of consumer information as part of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, where the debtor entity had promised its consumers not to 
sell or share customer information.254  Toysmart.com was, typical of 
modern pro-consumer contract cases, a mere flash in the pan.  The 
industry standard clauses regarding resale of consumer information 
were promptly rewritten to permit ad infinitum resale of consumer 
information.255  But again, it is worth noting that enforcing 
consumer-proffered contract terms will help to correct for the one-way 
ratchet that current online contracting trends have established.  It is 
quite possible, therefore, that if courts permit robust consumer-
proffered contracting, then the FTC will see violations of those 
contract terms as grounds to intervene under its section 5 authority to 
sanction unfair business practices. 
 
 251.  See e.g., FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. Civ.A. 00-CV11341RGS, 2000 WL 1523287 
(D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000) (alleging that Toysmart violated the terms of its privacy policy with 
consumers about disclosure of personal information and therefore engaged in deceptive acts or 
practices in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act); see also In re Gateway 
Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443 (2004). 
 252.  See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 220, at 302 (“[T]his turn to objective 
manifestations of privacy embodied in social norms has been used by the FTC to protect privacy 
where technological changes render traditional reliance on consent inoperative, or at least 
incomplete.”). The article continues by discussing the problem of the FTC’s roving enforcement 
and inconsistency on privacy concerns for consumers and how this has been significant. Id. 
 253.  Id. at 314-15 (“Finally, as the privacy community reflects upon the key global 
instruments of data protection, our account underscores the importance of empirical inquiry and 
thick institutional engagement in considering contested issues of regulatory strategy, 
technological complexity, social and institutional networks, and the protection of individual and 
communal interests in the private sphere. If privacy is to be protected in an increasingly 
connected world, debates over its formal regulation must increasingly be informed by the ways 
that today's frameworks operate on the ground.”). 
 254.  See id. 
 255.  See Richard A. Beckmann, Comment, Privacy Policies And Empty Promises: Closing 
The “Toysmart Loophole,” 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 765, 788 n.159-60. 
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Establishing a do-not-track option as a consumer-side 
contractual term that corporations must respect would, at a minimum, 
accomplish two things.  First, it would return control over contractual 
relations to consumers.256  Second, it would establish that companies 
are systematically breaking their contractual promises to consumers 
when they track those consumers despite an expressed preference 
against tracking.  Such a systematic breach of relations between 
corporation and consumer would lay a more solid groundwork for FTC 
intervention. 257 
C. On Geese and Gander: Why Favor Corporate Interests? 
This Section will argue that corporations and consumers 
should have equal power to offer enforceable contract terms.  It will 
then provide several examples of other areas in the law where this 
kind of equalization has been successful.  The most successful 
movements in Web 2.0258 have turned the tables on corporations by 
relying on courts’ basic intuitions of fairness.259  The developed and 
powerful law of intellectual property that corporations built over the 
past two decades was put at consumers’ fingertips through the CC 
licenses.260  This Article promotes a similar proposal for data 
protection: that the developed law of online contracting, which until 
 
 256.  See Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1638 (“Code-based negotiations for confidentiality can 
form implied-in-fact contracts or give rise to a claim for promissory estoppel.”). 
 257.  See FTC: A Brief Overview, supra note 244 (describing the FTC’s authority to 
regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices). For an example of the FTC’s willingness to 
intervene in consumer privacy cases where there is a violation of the contractual promises 
between corporation and consumer, see Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy 
Practices in Google’s Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network: Google Agrees to Implement 
Comprehensive Privacy Program to Protect Consumer Data (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm (“The FTC complaint charges that Google violated its 
privacy policies . . . .”).  
 258.  See Matthew J. Wilson, E-Elections: Time for Japan to Embrace Online 
Campaigning, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 1 (“Internet users spend significant time using ‘Web 
2.0’ technologies and other World Wide Web tools (collectively ‘Internet tools’) that enable 
interactive information sharing, user-centered design, collaboration, and a compilation of 
collective intelligence.”). 
 259.  E.g., Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (Rahmeyer, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he same contract principles hold on the Internet. When the consumer is 
presented with a contract of adhesion containing lengthy provisions and hidden terms, I believe 
courts should consider whether the process of assent or terms of the contract are 
unconscionable.”). 
 260.  See About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Oct. 
8, 2011) (“[The creative commons system] give[s] everyone from individual creators to large 
companies and institutions a simple, standardized way to keep their copyright while allowing 
certain uses of their work—a ‘some rights reserved’ approach to copyright—which makes their 
creative, educational, and scientific content instantly more compatible with the full potential of 
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now has served only corporate interests, be put to use by protecting 
consumers.261 
The project falls apart, however, if courts are not willing to 
grant the same contract power to consumers that they do to 
corporations.  They could refuse to do so through a range of options, as 
noted above.262  For example, courts could deny the existence of the 
consumer-proffered terms, as in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.263  Under 
Hill and its progeny, courts acted as though consumers’ preferences 
simply did not exist, or had no validity because they were not 
contained within the corporate document.264 
Indeed, of all of the challenges to the current proposal, this is 
the most dangerous.  When courts simply will not consider consumer 
preferences to be part of “the” contract between the parties because 
they are not expressed within the four corners of the corporate 
contract, these courts destroy any hope of consumers protecting their 
personal privacy.265  This is an even more untoward extension of the 
preferences courts have already extended to corporations in the online 
contracting arena.  Under modern contract case law, consumers may 
not offer contract terms or expect courts to enforce those terms. 
Furthermore, courts do not even consider consumer preferences unless 
they appear in the corporate contract.266  Imagine the counterfactual: 
courts would ignore corporate contractual preferences unless they 
appeared in the consumer’s data-use terms.  If what were good for the 
consumer goose were good for the corporate gander, all corporate 
online contracts would have no effect, just as consumer terms are now 
ignored. 
If courts are legally rigorous and have not lost their sense of 
fair play, then they will recognize consumer contractual terms and 
should reach some form of accommodation.  That might mean 
cancelling the entire contract based on a lack of meeting of the 
minds.267  More likely, it may be some form of “last shot” analysis that 
may continue to favor corporations as long as courts continue to treat 
 
 261.  See LESSIG, supra note 30, at 228-30 (arguing for a contractual model to protect 
privacy). 
 262.  See supra Part III.A-B.  
 263.  Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining how 
there is no battle-of-the-forms situation when consumers purchase items with contracts 
attached, and that such contracts are binding on both sellers and purchasers). 
 264.  See id. at 1148 (“Terms inside Gateway’s box stand or fall together. If they 
constitute the parties’ contract because the Hills had an opportunity to return the computer after 
reading them, then all must be enforced.”). 
 265.  See Knapp, supra note 6, at 102-04; see also Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1635-36. 
 266.  See, e.g., Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149-50. 
 267.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981) (citing cases in which an 
absence of a meeting of the minds led to unenforceability of a contract). 
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keeping the product as signifying assent—the last action.  However, a 
“last shot” analysis can also favor the consumer by, for example, 
treating the corporation’s acceptance of payment or failure to recall 
the product as actions that accept the consumer’s terms.268 
Ideally, courts should give effect to each party’s preferences as 
expressed in automated machine-offered terms that are readable by 
the counterparty, insofar as they are not considered absolutely 
contrary to each other.  And when they directly contradict—that is, 
when the corporation wishes to track an individual who has expressed 
the clear and simple wish not to be tracked—then the court should 
find that the parties have not reached a deal.  No deal means no 
tracking, on pain of violation of hacking laws, or liability for cyber 
trespass, or other background default laws and rules. 
The final vision here is one of computer-mediated automated 
contracting between consumer and corporation.  Consumers would 
offer to sell their information based on standardized terms, 
represented by check boxes in their browsers.  ISPs and online service 
providers would code their preferences for information purchases into 
their web servers.  Computers would perform a match.  If the match is 
exact, the contract contains the terms, both consumer check box and 
corporate-drafted, that both parties have agreed to.  If the terms are 
such that the parties do not substantially agree, and they do not do 
business with each other (because the corporate server refuses the 
consumer’s connection) then there is still no tracking problem.  If the 
corporation accepts the consumer’s connection with full understanding 
of the consumer’s expressed privacy preference, then the corporation 
must respect that preference under two theories—either the 
corporation would be deemed to have accepted the consumer’s 
preferences by accepting the communication, or the differences 
between the two would be so irreconcilable that any court would find 
there was effectively no contract.  This would, of course, lead to a 
no-tracking result, since a result of no deal means the corporation did 
not secure the consumer’s consent to tracking. 
 
 268.  Cf. Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(discussing how § 2-207 of the UCC was created in part to do away with the common law’s “last 
shot” rule of contract formation). According to the “last shot” rule, “the offeree/counterofferor gets 
all of its terms simply because it fired the last shot in the exchange of forms.” Id. 
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D. Is there a Remedy? 
After AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,269 there is one 
remaining caveat to the implementation of consumer do-not-track 
preferences as contract terms.  Assuming the consumer prevails, what 
would the remedy be?  Class actions in consumer mass-market 
contracting have decreased after Concepcion,270 and privacy class 
actions have fared particularly poorly in the courts.271  How does a 
theory of do-not-track as contract alter this dynamic? 
Without offering a deep discourse on the availability of 
remedies in consumer e-commercial contracts, especially since courts 
render most remedies moribund by enforcing corporate-drafted 
limitations of remedies clauses, this Article offers some limited 
suggestions.  First, the consumer often wants the ISP to take some 
action, such as taking down defamatory or embarrassing content, or in 
the case of a privacy-conscious consumer, requiring the corporation to 
delete the data.272 
Specific performance—requiring a company to delete a 
consumer’s data that it has extra-contractually gathered—seems a 
simple, straightforward, and reasonable remedy.  Remedies at law 
(damages) do not solve the plaintiff’s problem of data remaining 
outside her control.  Thus, under the standard test for specific 
performance, damages are inadequate, and specific performance is not 
a particularly difficult remedy to obtain.273  The UCC encourages 
liberal use of specific performance.274 And outside of the UCC, the 
inadequacy of legal damages should lead courts to order Internet or 
 
 269.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (upholding the 
Federal Arbitration Act against a judicial rule that would require class arbitration despite 
contractual waivers). 
 270.  See id. at 1746 (holding that California’s Discover Bank rule—which holds that class 
waivers are unconscionable when found in a contract of adhesion—is an obstacle to 
Congressional objectives in the FAA and therefore preempted); see also Jones, supra note 202 
(noting how the Concepcion decision may threaten the viability of class-action suits in the 
future). 
 271.  See Ian C. Ballon & Wendy Mantell, Cloud Litigation: Suing Over Data Privacy and 
Behavioral Advertising, CENTURY CITY LAW., Sept. 2011, available at http://centurycitybar. 
com/newslettertemplate/Sept11/article2.htm (“Courts have dismissed putative privacy class 
action suits where consent was inferred from a TOU agreement or a Privacy Policy.”). 
 272.  See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 28-29, White v. Clearspring Techs., Inc., No. 
2:2010-cv-05948 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010), ECF No. 27 (demanding, in part, relief in the form of 
deleting consumer data collected in the forms complained of). 
 273.  See Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A 
Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1205 (2011) (“It is 
commonly said that specific performance is available only when damages are ‘inadequate.’”). 
 274.  See U.C.C. § 2-716 (2003) (“Specific performance may be decreed if the goods are 
unique or in other proper circumstances.”). 
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online service providers that breach consumer’s contractual 
conditions, to delete the data. 
As noted above, consumer-offered contract terms may also have 
some impact on a particular method for legal adjudication of small 
harms—the class action.  After Concepcion, it appears that Internet 
class actions face significant additional legal hurdles from the 
prevalence and enforcement of arbitration clauses that preclude class 
treatment.275  But, for Concepcion to apply, the arbitration clause in 
the corporate contract must be the operative legal clause.276  Courts 
will enforce corporate rights and remedies limitations only if they 
ignore consumer contractual language retaining all legal rights and 
remedies—specifically including the right to a court trial.  If courts 
permit a consumer contracting approach, the consumer may include a 
no-arbitration clause alongside her do-not-track option.  Once courts 
permit consumers to draft contracts rather than merely sign them, 
these consumers can better defend their legal rights. 
E. Corporate Objections to the Do-Not-Track Proposal 
Consumer machine-mediated contracting is as valid and 
enforceable as corporate machine-mediated contracting.  Despite the 
simplicity and limited scope of the do-not-track proposal, it will 
certainly draw significant corporate objections.  This Section seeks to 
anticipate and answer some of the likely objections. 
First, corporations will claim that they lack notice of 
consumer-proffered contract terms.  But courts have already rejected 
the argument that consumers lacked notice of the contents of 
corporate machine-mediated contracts.277  If consumers have notice of 
corporate terms buried in prolix EULAs, corporations certainly would 
have notice of simple, machine-readable flags set in a consumer’s 
browser. 
 
 275.  See Jones, supra note 202 (noting that the Concepcion result threatens class action 
suits). 
 276.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742-43 (2011) (“Section 2’s 
saving clause permits agreements to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses,’ 
but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or derive their meaning from the fact that an 
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”). 
 277.  See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL 
3419499, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (“Plaintiff’s argument that she was not provided with 
sufficient notice of the contractual terms she was assenting to because of Zynga’s modified 
clickwrap presentation, and therefore is not bound by any arbitration provision, fails in light of 
recent caselaw holding that clickwrap presentations providing a user with access to the terms of 
service and requiring a user to affirmatively accept the terms, even if the terms are not 
presented on the same page as the acceptance button, are sufficient.”). 
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Corporations might also claim that they did not have any 
power to object to consumer-proffered contracts.  Again, courts 
rejected the argument that consumers had no choice but to accede to 
the terms of corporate machine-mediated contracts.278  Unless courts 
are willing to embrace a jurisprudence of pure corporate preference, 
corporations should be held to the same standards when they agree to 
consumer terms as consumers are when they agree to corporate terms.  
Only procedural unfairness leading to a substantively unconscionable 
result would permit the corporation to escape from its promises.279  
And it is quite hard—almost laughable—to imagine a corporation 
legitimately arguing that a consumer had so much market power that 
it forced the corporation to agree to substantively unfair terms.  
Moreover, the term at issue here—consumer privacy as expressed in a 
do-not-track flag—is not substantively unfair. 
The strongest objection is that courts should enforce the 
corporation’s version of the contract rather than the consumer’s 
version.  Some variation of the four corners or parol evidence doctrine 
may convince courts to continue ignoring consumers’ contractual 
preferences.280  But if courts follow black-letter contract law, the buyer 
is the master of the offer and the seller may agree to the buyer’s terms 
or refuse the transaction.281  Courts should not manipulate the 
moment of offer and counteroffer until the corporation’s terms 
mysteriously come out as the enforced terms.282 
A do-not-track option should be a core part of any data 
transaction.  It is expressed up front in machine-readable format.  The 
corporation knows what the deal is in crystal clear terms.  So, as noted 
above, if the corporation does not wish to do business with customers 
who do not want to be tracked, it is free to refuse the connection at 
that first point of contact.  Nothing could be simpler.  When courts 
 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 (2010) (“As required to 
make out a claim of unconscionability under Nevada law, he contended that the Agreement was 
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 280.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1856 (West 2011) (describing California’s parol evidence 
rule).   
 281.  See U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (2003); see also discussion supra note 185. 
 282.  See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069-71 (R.I. 2009); see also Budnitz, 
supra note 156. 
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attempt to complicate matters, it looks suspiciously like naked 
corporate preference.283 
Another possible objection is that automated consumer 
contractual preferences more complicated than do-not-track will place 
an impermissible burden on corporations to read the contracts that 
they enter into with their consumers.284  This burden did not 
particularly bother corporations when customers had to track 
hundreds of privacy policies from many different institutions. 
But herein lies the larger point: to reduce information costs, 
both buyers and sellers online should be able to offer standard and 
automated contract terms with the full expectation that a court would 
enforce their terms.  By way of contrast, the current system permits 
corporations to contract by computer and requires consumers to 
contract by hand.  The current system permits corporations to “read” 
contracts by machine, but requires consumers to read contracts in 
person.  The imbalance in transaction costs is colossal.  Currently 
consumers must read thousands of different agreements to even begin 
protecting their privacy online.  None do, and it is no wonder; the law 
has predetermined their failure.  Information costs would be far lower 
if a consumer could express her preferences once and expect that 
corporations would respect those preferences.  Information costs would 
be lower for corporations too, who would merely have to check the 
consumer’s browser handshake protocol to see if the consumer had 
expressed a preference not to be tracked. 
Corporate advocates are wrong when they claim that 
consumer-offered contract terms would raise information costs for 
corporations.  The entire system at the moment revolves around 
consumers shouldering massive information costs.  Corporations do 
not want to identify or respect their customers’ privacy preferences; 
they instead intend to continue taking, aggregating, and reselling 
private consumer information.  Corporations continue this behavior 
based on the theory that the consumer has “consented” to sale of her 
personal information, even though the corporation has been clearly 
and cleanly informed upon every instance of being contacted by the 
consumer that this consent is withheld. 
This false consent model cannot be the future of online 
contracting.  Among other things, consumers are becoming producers.  
This is the result of the Web 2.0 model combined with so-called 
 
 283.  See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 66, at 440-41. 
 284.  See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy 
(What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 76 (“The problems with P3P have now 
been widely reported. Technical experts have noted that the protocols are complex, difficult to 
implement, and unlikely to enable consumer to protect privacy. . . . Industry analysts have also 
found shortcomings in the P3P proposal.” (footnote omitted)).  
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“prosumer” electronic equipment, which permits consumers to create 
professional grade products.285  Consumers are already wearing two 
hats—consumer and professional.  They are clearly able to draft, offer, 
and enforce contractual terms in their professional capacity.  The 
current trend of denying consumers the right to offer contract terms in 
their consumer capacity simply cannot continue. 
Another challenge to this Article’s hypothesis is that some have 
already unsuccessfully attempted consumer-choice privacy models.286  
A discussion of prior efforts toward consumer privacy choice, notably 
the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), can explain how the 
proposed solution is significantly different from those prior efforts. 
The P3P, a consumer privacy system developed by the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C), attempted to simplify the interaction 
between websites and consumers by automating the consumer’s 
“review” of a given site’s privacy policy.287  Websites could, if they 
wished, fill out a multiple-choice survey about their privacy policy, 
which was translated into a privacy policy that the consumer’s web 
browser would read.288  Provided they had P3P-enabled browsers, 
users then indicated their privacy preference, which was translated 
and compared with sites’ privacy policies.289  Despite being 
implemented in Internet Explorer 6 and Netscape 7,290 P3P 
experienced very limited success even by those who worked vigorously 
to promote it.291 
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One of the fatal flaws in P3P was its insufficiency as a 
stand-alone system for privacy protection.292  The lack of mandatory 
enforcement—any legal backing for the preferences expressed in 
P3P—led to P3P’s non-adoption and demise.293  It is precisely for this 
reason that courts should enforce do-not-track as a contract term 
while the FTC works out whether or not it will formulate a rule. 
P3P’s complexity also contributed to its lack of adoption.  P3P 
replicated the complexity of a corporate privacy policy on the 
consumer side.  The consumer had to deal with a “dashboard” 
interface that presented multiple confusing options.294  The 
infamously byzantine Facebook privacy controls are a modern 
example—controls clearly built to create serious transaction costs for 
privacy,295 induce choice paralysis, and cause consumers to abandon 
their attempts to control private information.  The complexity of 
approaches like P3P impacted corporations as well.  As a result of 
complexity on the consumer side, there were too many options for 
webmasters, which ultimately made implementation less appealing.296  
An automated system for protecting privacy would need to address 
these issues of complexity and voluntary implementation.297 
Do-not-track expresses a single, unitary, clear, 
machine-readable option that communicates at every instance of the 
user’s contact with a corporation that she does not consent to her 
information being tracked.  This is a distinction with a difference.  The 
entire framework of online tracking is built on consent.298  None of it 
makes sense if corporations ignore the clear and oft-repeated 
statement that a consumer does not give consent to tracking.  Any 
effort to return control over private information to consumers must, in 
the first instance, take the form of an enforceable right to complete 
prohibition. 
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Industry advocates claim that consumers want more “nuanced” 
privacy settings.299  This is quite wrong: consumers want simple, 
strong, and enforceable privacy settings.300  The argument for 
“nuanced” consumer privacy settings is doublespeak for creating 
privacy settings complicated enough to induce choice paralysis, which 
is profitable to corporations.  But even if one assumes that consumers 
want nuanced and complicated privacy settings, the analysis of this 
Article does not change.  A nuanced privacy setting is not enforceable 
if a simple one is not.  If consumers cannot say, simply, “I do not 
consent to any tracking in any form under any circumstances” and 
expect courts to enforce that statement, then we cannot begin to 
consider the enforcement or utility of more complicated statements of 
consumer preference.301 
Courts must first enforce consumers’ clearly, simply, and 
continuously communicated preferences of an absolute right to be let 
alone.  Complex, nuanced statements of privacy preferences may only 
be considered once courts have established this basic right.  This 
Author’s sense is that consumers will never need that second step.  
Consumers will not seek these theoretically desirable nuanced or 
complicated privacy arrangements once courts enforce a simple, 
continuous, and clear expression not to be tracked, not least because 
consumers rightly distrust complicated privacy arrangements.302  
Corporations have so abused consumer trust in the information 
market that rejecting nuanced privacy arrangements seems both 
easily predictable and amply justified. 
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In assessing do-not-track’s feasibility, P3P’s failure serves as a 
useful blueprint going forward.303  Do-not-track as contract addresses 
P3P’s main limitations in two key ways.  First, do-not-track is 
incredibly simple: there is only one option to select and follow.  
Second, do-not-track is enforceable under the law of contract in its 
own right, and may draw regulatory support from the FTC.304  
Conversely, corporate resistance to do-not-track rings hollow.305  
Corporate protestations lack credibility given the transaction costs 
and lack of notice currently imposed on consumers.306  A corporation 
has the power to refuse the connection if the proffered terms are too 
complex or are not offered in machine-readable format.  If terms 
beyond do-not-track are expressed in a consumer’s automated contract 
with an online service provider, the service provider is free to 
terminate the connection.  Corporations have successfully used this 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article advances a simple hypothesis: consumers should 
be able to effectively offer their own enforceable terms in online 
contracts.  There is no reasoned ground in contract law or the 
economic weighing of transaction costs to prohibit consumers from 
doing so.  Further, consumer-proffered automated contracts offer a 
potential solution to several long-standing and troubling conundrums 
in online contract law as it has drifted from its traditional 
common-law moorings. 
The problem of online contracting is one of information 
poisoning: there is too much information.  This is true for privacy 
policies, EULAs, and TOSs.  Corporate-drafted contracts may look like 
the contracts that courts are accustomed to enforcing, but they are 
written in legalese that consumers are unlikely to understand.  
Further, enforcing corporate terms in individual consumer cases does 
not simplify analysis across cases.  Each corporate privacy policy may 
seem simple, well drafted, and therefore the best document for a court 
to enforce.  But each policy is different, and the number of online 
corporate privacy policies, EULAs, and TOSs is high. 
To the extent that courts have tried to address the problem of 
online contracting, they have attempted to reinsert humans into the 
contracting equation by insisting that consumers read an ever-greater 
number of ever-longer contracts.  Even courts that have identified 
information costs as the problem have determined, incorrectly, that 
the solution is more information.  The problem of too much 
information cannot be solved by more information. 
The answer is not more humans in electronic contracting, but 
more computers.  Rather than resolving these enduring questions of 
consumer contracts by reemphasizing the human element of 
contracting, this Article proposes to permit consumers to offer 
enforceable contract terms via automated processes.  Consumers 
should be able to set machine-readable contract terms in precisely the 
same manner that corporations do now.  The law as it stands is deeply 
imbalanced because only corporations can conduct their contracting in 
an automated manner.  Consumer-side automated contracting would 
put the power to determine contract terms—and thus privacy—back 
in individuals’ hands. 
 
